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I. Introduction

When the Walls Come
Tumbling Down
The Demise of the Northwest
Power Act
James 0. Luce"

This Article examines the Pacific Northwest Electric
Power Planning and Conservation Act of 19801 (the
"Northwest Power Acr or the "Ac i. The Act codifies a complex, interrelated, and interdependent series of entitlements
and public benefits which have in common one feature: they
are all paid for by the ratepayers of the Bonneville Power
Administration (BPA), a wholesale power marketing agency
of the Department of Energy.2 That is the bad news. The
good news is that the ratepayers and certain public interests
located within the Pacific Northwest are also the beneficiaries.
Providing public benefits or administering entitlements
has never been a problem for BPA. In fairness, allocating
such benefits is an underlying agency statutory purpose. 3

& Mr. James 0. Luce received a BA. In 1968 from Washington State
University. He is a graduate of the University of Oregon School of Law, and
a member of the Washington State Bar. Employed by the Bonneville Power
Administration. Mr. Luce is an Assistant General Counsel with primary
responsibility for environmental Issues. Prior to joining BPA. he served as a
legislative assistant to the late U.S. Senator Henry M.'Scoop" Jackson (DVA) and as a Deputy Prosecutor for Snohomish County. Washingon.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the
views of the Bonneville Power Administration. the Department of Energy. or
the United States.
I. Pub. L No. 96-501. 94 Stat. 2697 (1980) (codified at 16 U.S.C. 4
839-839h (1994)).
2.The Bonneville PowerAdministration (BPA) was originally an agency
of the Department of Interior. SezS. RE. No. J64.95th Cong.. 1st Sess. 29-30
(1977) (accompanying S. 826. Department of Energy Organization Act). It
was transferred to the Department of Energy in 1977 when the Department
was established by Congress in order to assure a coordinated national energy policy. See Department of Energy Organization Act. Pub. L No. 95-91. §
302. 91 Stat. 565 (1977) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7101-521 (1994. Bonneville
must charge rates for its power and transmission services that repay in full
the cost of its power and transmission facilities. Section 7 of the Bonneville
Project Act of 1937 specifies that 'lilt Is the intent of Congress that rate
schedules ... shall be drawn having regard to the recovery ... of the cost of
produdng and transmitting such electric energy. including the amortization
of the capital Investment over a reasonable period of years.: 16 U.S.C. § 832f
(1994). See also § 9 of the Federal Columbia River TransmissIon System Act
of 1974 providing that rates established shall have due -regard to the recovery ... of the cost of producing and transmitting such electric power. including the amortization of the capital investment allocated to power overa reasonable period of years: 16 U.S.C. § 838g (1994). The regulations establishing BPAs finandal reporting and detailing the -cost recovery critena" are set
forth In U.S. Department of Energy Order 6120.2 (September 20. 1979).
3. The list of public benefits Is a long one. The following examples are
illustrative but not complete. The original Bonneville Prolect Act of 1937
(codified at 16 U.S.C. § 832-8321 (1994)) provides that the generation of electric energy shall be operated "for the benefit of the general public, and particularly of domestic and rural consumers: 16 U.S.C. § 832c(a) (1994). This
"preference and priority" for "public bodies and cooperatives" has since
been extended to the entire Pacific Northvest through the Pacific Northwest
Consumer Preference Act of 1964. 16 U.S.C. § 837(a)-(c) (1994), and to the
citizens of the State of Montana through the Hungry Horse Dam Act of 1944.
Pub. L No. 78-329. § 593a-b. 58 Stat. 270 (1944) (amended 1958).The rates
for BPA's powerare based on the 'postage stamp" principle-. that is. rates are
uniform throughout prescribed transmission areas In order to extend the
benefits of an Integrated transmission system and encourage the equitable
distribution of the electric energy: 16 U.S.C. § 832e (1994). Rates are also to
be "the lowest possible rates to consumers consistent with sound business
principles." 16 U.S.C. § 838g (1994). See § 5 of the Flood ControlAct of 1944.
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And so long as BPA's role as the primary, low cost,
Pacific Northwest power purveyor was unchallenged, these benefits could be paid for. What has
changed is the deregulation of the utility industry, a
deregulation which eliminates BPAs monopoly
power and places its financial condition on5 red
alert 4 while it undergoes the necessary change.
In the process, BPPs ability to continue provid-6
ing public benefits has come into serious question.
The Act's fish and wildlife entitlement is currently
receiving the most public attention, but benefits for
public and private utilities, irrigators, and large
industry are also costly and undergoing scrutiny.7
Everyone supports BPAs efforts to control costs,
provided that their own special package of benefits
is not at risk. What is a "subsidy" for one group is a
"God given right" for another, but whether you call it
a "helping hand" or a "hand out" the result is the
same: to drive up rates and make BPA less competitive. 8 Cumulatively, this poses a difficult, but not
impossible, challenge.
16 U.s.C. § 825s (1994), as construed to apply to Bonneville in 41
Op. Att'y. Gen. 236 (1955) and later expressly applied in §9 of the
Federal Columbia River Transmission System Act of 1974,
16 U.S.C. § 838g (1994).
The original preference and price benefits are not alone. To
encourage irrigated agriculture, BPA was also directed to absorb
within its rates any costs "beyond the ability of the irngation
water users to repay." 16 U.s.C. § 835k (1994).
Other public benefits are discussed infra.
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The Article looks at BPA's costs under the Act,
including those in the rapidly growing fish and
wildlife area where the influence of the Endangered
Species Act is an expensive and complicating factor.
It tests some of the key assumptions that underlay
the Act's passage against the test of time, and finds
them lacking. Finally, it suggests possible administrative and legislative options to assure BPA's survival, assuming that BPA's survival Is in the best
interest of the Pacific Northwest. 9 On that key question, opinions vary. However, the central premise of
this Article is that while BPA must change to adjust
to an increasingly competitive electric utility market, it is imprudent to privatize or otherwise dismantle one of the few Federal agencies which conduct its operations consistent with sound business
principles, and repays with interest the taxpayer
investment in its system. For more than sixty years
BPA has effectively implemented its primary statutory purposes. These include (1) serving as a "yardstick" to assure that all Northwest utilities, includ(on file with Northwest Power Planning Council). Mr, Wilcox, an
attorney, represented large aluminum companies when the
Northwest Power Act of 1980 was considered by Congress,

7. See NORTHWEST

POWER PLANNING COUNCIL,

Supra note 6,

8. See BPA BUSINESS PLAN FEIS, supra note 5 chs. 1, 1.1.

9. BPA and the Department of Energy have called for a
"regional and comprehensive review of BPA's role and structure In
the Pacific Northwest" for many of the same reasons set forth In
this Article. Press Release from U.S. Department, of Energy, at I
4. See generally BONNEVILLE POWER ADMINISTRATION,
(Sept. 28, 1995) [hereinafter DOE Press Releas, ]. The review Is
DOEBP-2521, 1994 ANN. REP. (1995); BONNEVILLE POWER
currently ongoing, and will include reexamination of the
ADMINISTRATION,
DOE/BP-2800, 1995 ANN. REP. (1996) Ihereinafter
Northwest Power Act of 1980 and BPA's other organic statutes
"BPA 1994 ANN. REP." and "BPA 1995 ANN. REP.." respectively).
recognizing the need for change because of the changed regulaBPA's financial condition has somewhat improved, While BPA
tory environment. That same review is referenced In the
ended 1995 with revenues of $196 million, a 16% increase from
Conference Report accompanying H.R. 1905, together with a call
1994, the outlook is now more positive. BPA expects $338 million
for greater regional control of fish and wildlife resources through
in revenues by the end of 1996. BPA 1995 ANN. REP., supra, at 21.
increased reliance on the Northwest Power Planning Council's
5. BPA has been designated a "reinvention laboratory" as a
Fish and Wildlife Program. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1905, 104th Cong.,
part of the Clinton Administration's "National Performance
Ist Sess. 93 (1995).
Review" plan to reinvent the federal government. BPA has also
At the same time, U.S. Senator Slade Goton (R-WA) has
separately contracted with the National Academy of Public
initiated a parallel and complementary process "to develop legisAdministration (NAPA). NAPs 1993 report to BPA, REINVENTING
lation to rewrite the Northwest Power Act," and sent a letter to
THE BONNEVILLE POWER ADMINISTRATION(1993), has significantly
selected individuals asking for their views on ten key questions,
influenced BPAs recently published business plan and the govLetter from Senator Slade Gorton (Jan. 18, 1996). Senator
ernment corporation legislation which is being discussed within
Gorton's own views were set forth on the same day, His five goals
Congress and the Clinton Administration. See BONNEVILLE POWER
include (1) regional control over fish and wildlife, (2) creation of
ADMINISTRATION, DOEIBP-2664, BUSINESS PLAN (1995) and accoman energy system that better serves Northwes: consumers; (3)
panying BONNEVILLE POWER ADMINISTRATION, DOE/EIS-0183,
reform of the Northwest Power Act; (4) equal access to the BPA
BUSINESS PLAN FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT (1995).lheretransmission system; and (5) reexamination of existing programs,
inafter "BPA Business Plan" and "BPA Business Plan FEIS."
Senator Slade Gorton, Statement before The Energy Conference
respectively).
(Jan. 18, 1996). The Gorton initiative Is particularly Important
6. The Northwest Power Planning Council (NWPPC) has
because with the retirement of Senator Mark -latfield (R-OR),
issued a paper addressing BPs future. See NORTHWEST POWER
Senator Gorton will be the ranking northwest Republican memPLANNING COUNCIL, Doc. No. 95-14, STAFF ISSUE PAPER: THE ROLE OF
ber on the Appropriations Committee that revievs BPA's budget,
THE BONNEVILLE POWER ADMINISTRATIONIN A COMPETITIVE ENERGY
Senator Gorton's goal of crafting a legislative package that fairly
MARKET (1995). Under separate cov&r the NWPPC has also carcubalances economic and environmental Interests will be challenglated a July 19, 1995 letter from Mr. Brett Wilcox. President of the
ing, as will the integration of the governors' "Regional Review"
Northwest Aluminum Company. Letter from Brett Wilcox,
recommendations into such a package.
President, Northwest Aluminum Company. to Randy Hardy,
Administrator, Bonneville Power Administration (lul. 19, 1995)

Ulm Th
&hq 11chn
ci
ai Eimn
aI Cam
h 17n
We

Win 1996

Winier 1996
ing BPA competitors, provide consumers the lowest
possible electric rates; (2) providing a high quality
reliable transmission system stretching from
Canada to California with access for all users; and
(3) investing billions for social benefits such as conservation, renewable resources, and fish and
wildlife protection.
However, with respect to the Northwest Power
Act, the Article concludes that most, if not all of
the Act's assumptions are invalid; that those
assumptions supported a fiscally imprudent and
overly generous set of benefits; and that time has
shown that the Act's passage was largely unnecessary. The hope is that if Congress chooses to enact
-new legislation, it will not repeat previous mistakes by passing another highly structured,
extremely complex, and technical law whose
sponsors are convinced that they can foresee the
future. The "Code Napoleon" approach which
seeks to anticipate every contingency may work
well for the French. It has not worked for BPA, nor
is it a good model for the utility industry.
Unexpected events inevitably lay waste to laws
written by legislators who presume they can foresee the future.
II. OverviewBPA was born in 1937, a child of the
Roosevelt Administration.10 BPAs statutory missior was to sell bulk power, provide transmission
services and to encourage competition in the
10. See Gus NORWOOD, DFPARTENT OF ENERGY. DOE-BP-7,
COLUMBIA RIVER POWER FOR THE PEOPLE A HISTORY OF POUCIES OF THE
BONNEVILLE POWER ADMINISTRATION 796-874 (198l). Norwood

recounts President Franklin D. Roosevelrs relationship to BPA"rhe Great Depression tnggered maior Federal development of
the Columbia River when President Roosevelt approved starting
construction of Grand Coulee and Bonneville dams In 1933 to
provide jobs. id. at 29. By approving the construction prolect.
President Roosevelt fulfilled a promise made in Portland. Oregon
in a September 21. 1932 presidential campaign speech: 'Wehave
...
the vast possibilities of power development on the Columbia
River. And I state, in definite and certain terms, that the next great
hydroelectnc development to be undertaken by the Federal govemnment must be on that Columbia River.' Id.at 26.
iI. The Bonneville Project Act of 1937 is dear and unambiguous as regards its purposes. The Administrator -shall make all
arrangements for the sale and disposition of electric energy.- 16
U.S.C. § 832(a) (1994). He is "authonzed and directed to provide.
construct, operate, and maintain such electnc transmission lines
and substations as he finds necessary" for this purpose. Id.§ 832a[b).
And in making these sales and providing transmission fadlities he is
'to encourage the widest possible use of all electric energy that can
be generated and marketed and to provide reasonable outlets therefor.and to prevent monopolization thereof by limited groups. Id.
i2. See Nomroorsupra note 10. at64-68 (discussing formationof
key BPA power poliaes which have guided BPA, Induding preference
and pnority for public bodies and 'postage stamp" wheeling rates to
assure that all BPA customers paid the same rate no matter how distant they were located from the dams that produce the power).

electric utility business in the Pacific
Northwest." Private utility rates were viewed as
exorbitantly high, and private utilities were
understandably reluctant to serve many rural
areas because of the high costs of doing business
associated with serving low density areas.
Bonneville was to be a "yardstick' against which
private utility service would be measured, with a
preference and price structure that would encourage the formation of public utilities and cooperatives to compete with private utilities and serve
areas they were unwilling to reach.ia
Bonneville is governed by four organic statutes.
The Bonneville Project Act of 1937 is BPA's original
organic statute 3 Modeled after the Boulder Dam
Act and the Tennessee Valley Act. 14 the Project Act
sets forth broad guidelines and policies, and
entrusts to the BPA Administrator a great deal of
discretion15 For instance, the Administrator is to
"act consistent with sound business principles" and
repay the federal investment in the Federal
Columbia River Power System. "Subject only to the
provisions of this Act," the Administrator may "enter
into such contracts, agreements, and'arrangements,
...
and make such expenditures ...
upon such terms
and conditions as he may deem necessary."1 6 Public
agencies are entitled to preference for and priority
to federal power.'7 The Act was amended only once,
and then for the purpose of increasing the
Administrators discretion to assure that BPA could
act in a business-like manner, free of the normal
constraints that bind federal agencies.' 8
13. 16 U.S.C. § 832-8321 (1994).
14. Se the testimony of Secetary of Interior Harold L Ickes
during a May 10, 1937 hearing before the House Committee on
Rivers and Harbors. Congressman Golden asked the Seaetar 'Your
position is ... that you want Bonneville under the same sort of
administration that we now have at Boulder Dam and that you propose to have at Grand Coulee. and somewhat similar to the TVA- t.
The Seaetary repliedi "ihatis right.' Columbia River (Bonneville
Dam), Oreg. and Wash., 1937. Hearing on H.R. 7642 before the
Committee on Rivers and Harbors. 75th Cong.. IstSess. 153 (1937).
15. The Administrators contracting authorities are illustrative. He Is authorized. "[slubect only to the provisions of this
Chapter, ... to enter into such contracts, agreements, and
arrangements, ... and to make such expenditures, upon such
terms and conditions and in such manner as he may deem necessary. 16 U.S.C. § 832a(f (1994).
16. Id.
17. Id.§ 832cla)-{d.
18. Sez Pub. L No. 75-329,5 0 Stat. 731 (1937) (codified at 16
U.S.C. § 832a(f) (1994) (offered by then Congressman, and later
Senator, Henry M. Jackson (D-VA)). The Senate Report from the
Committee on Commerce noted that BPA Is "a regional agency"
which 'must be as free as possible to deal with problems which
are essentially local matters. That Department exercises supervision only where malor policy considerations are involved and
leaves the administration of the policies to the Bonneville Power
Administrator IThs legislation] Is based on the same principle
S. REP. No. 469, 79th Cong.. Ist Sess. 4 (1945).
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In short, when Congress created BPA it created a
unique federal agency with both bureaucratic and
business attributes. The "left brain bureaucracy" and
"right brain business" statutory framework within
which BPA operates explains much of its history and
policy development.19 When power and transmission
revenues are high, BPA spends money freely and creates programs which raise customer and interest
group expectations. When revenues fall off, and programs must be cut to assure an ability to meet
Treasury repayment obligations, there is discord.
Whereas the Bonneville Project Act created a
preference right to BPA power for public utilities,
the Northwest Preference Act enacted in 1964
expands on the concept of preference by creating a
geographic preference and priority to Bonneville
power for all Northwest purchasers. 20 The Act also
facilitated
construction
of
the
Pacific
Northwest-Pacific Southwest Intertie and ratification of a U.S.-Canadian Treaty that assured construction of large power dams on the Columbia
River which both nations share in common.2 i It also
22
governed allocation of resulting power benefits.
The Federal Columbia River Transmission
System Act of 1974 (FCRTSA) established BPA as
the regional provider of large electric transmission
services.2 3 Of equal importance, it also frees BPA
19. Portland Gen. Elec. Co. v. Johnson, 754 F.2d 1475 (9th
Cir. 1985). PortlandGeneral Electric shows the latitude the courts will
allow BPA to operate consistent with sound business principles,
notwithstanding regulatory directives that are sometimes highly
prescriptive. In this case, BPA sold its direct service industry customers, largely aluminum companies, an amount of surplus
power, arguably without complying with the rate procedures of
the Northwest Power Act. Portland General argued that the rate
was unreasonable because it did not assure BPA would recover
its costs and therefore losses would be passed along to Portland
General and other BPA customers in the form of higher rates.
Holding in favor of BPA, the court concluded that although BPA
did not invoke ratemaking proceedings, "it was faced with the distinct possibility that it would soon spill water over its dams and
thereby forego the sale of the energy." Id. at 1482. Therefore,
because some revenues were better than no revenues and
because "unemployed workers could be rehired and the ailing
economy of the Pacific Northwest ... [given] a needed boost," it
was "in the interest of all parties that BPA enter into the challenged transactions." Id.
20. 16 U.S.C. ch. 12F (1994). "Our strategy was to devise a
bill to assure preference for BPA power would remain in the
Pacific Northwest" said Charles Luce, former Bonneville
Administrator. Charles F. Luce, Keynote Address at the Pacific
Northwest Utilities Conference Committee Annual Meeting (Nov.
18. 1988). Dunng heanngs before the Irrgation and Reclamation
Subcommittee of the House Interior Committee, Luce supported
regional preference on the grounds that Northwest industries
had a vested interest in cheap power and that it would be useful
to have a "defined market area." Id.
21. See NORWOOD, supra note 10, at 237-46 (discussing the
construction of the west coast interties to California and the relationship to regional preference legislation).

from the normal restraints of an appropriated
agency by making it self-funded and grants to24it certain attributes of a Government Corporation.
The Northwest Power Act of 1980 is the fourth
BPA organic statute and the focus of this Article.
The Act became law at a time of regional turbulence
in the electric utility business. BPA had earlier supported- the Corps of Engineers and Bureau of
Reclamation in their construction of -all cost effective hydroelectric resources on the Snake and
Columbia Rivers, and was the exclusive marketing
agent for the power produced by those dams. 25 BPA
had also entered into certain contracts with the
Washington Public Power Supply System and the
Eugene Water and Electric Board to acquire the
capability of nuclear resources,2 6 and signed
long-term exchange agreements with southern
California utilities. These contracts were signed in
the expectation that they would provide the BPA's
customers a long-term, reliable power supply.
Load forecasts, however, showed that despite
BPs best efforts the region was running out of
power. Demand would exceed supply unless prompt
action was taken. 27 Since public bodies entitled to
preference had first call on BPA power, others were
told that their contracts would not be renewed.
Notices of insufficiency were issued to private utili22. 16 U.S.C. § 837(a)-(h) (1994).
23. 16 U.S.C. §§838-838k (1994).
24. Congress approved the FCRTSA in April, 1974. It
stemmed from difficulties in carrying out long-range planning
associated with the hydrothermal power plant program In the
face of year-to-year Congressional appropriations. When
President Ford signed the bill in October. 1974, he described It as
a "solid step forward in meeting our energy requirements on an
orderly, planned basis." GENE TOLLEFSON, DEPARVIMENT Or ENERGY,
BPA AND THE STRUGGLE FORPOWER ATCosT 358 (19187),
25. 16 U.S.C. § 838f (1994).
26. The Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS)
owns several nuclear projects. BPA acquired 100Y6 of the capability of nuclear projects I and 2 pursuant to net billing agreements
with WPPSS and public utilities. BPA also acquired 70% of the
capability of proiect 3 pursuant to net billing agreements with
certain investor owned utilities. For a summary of these and
related agreements see WASHINGrON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM,
PROJECTS Nos. I AND 3 REFUNDING ELECTRIC REVENUE BONDS 1-17
(Dec. 15. 1989) Ihereinafter WPPSS PROJECTS
NOs, I & 31, For a

general description of conditions leading to net billing arrangements, see H.R. REP. No. 976, 96th Cong., 2d Sess 28-30 (1980),
27. See H.R. REP. No. 976, supra note 26;
In June of 1976, BPA recognized that'Federal power, includingthe "net billed" power, would be inadequate to meet the
projected needs of its preference customers, and Issued
notices of insufficency to its customers. This relieved BPA
from liability for any failure to satisfy preference customer
load growth after July 1. 1983. Similarly, BPA Informed Is
direct service industry customers that their contracts expiring in the 1981-91 period were not likely to bt renewed.
Id.at 25. See also Id.at 30.
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ties and the BPA's large direct service industrial customers, primarily aluminum companies.28 They
would not get new contracts when their existing
contracts expired. The aluminum companies threatened to take service directly from their local utilities, who were largely public utilities, thereby exacerbating the BPAs ability to meet all preference customer loads. 29 At the same time. existing public
utilities were alarmed that newly formed or proposed public utilities might compete with them for
a share of BPA's low-cost resources, thereby shrinking the preference slice of the power pie even further. One such quasi-utility, the State of Oregon's
Domestic and Rural Power Authority, threatened to
lay claim to a block of power large enough to serve
all domestic and farm load in the State of Oregon.3 0
As the situation deteriorated in the late 1970s,
BPA proposed an "allocation scheme" which satisfied almost no one.31 Private utilities, who were purchasing large blocks of BPA power, would no longer
receive power. Their residential and farm consumers
were already paying nearly twice the rates charged
by adjoining public utilities. Public utilities, however, were not happy either. They would not have all of
their power needs met. They would be forced to
acquire additional resources or purchase power on
the open market at a cost far in excess of what BPA
28. Id.The House Report also notes:
BPA, in furtherance of its belief that Federal power would
not be adequate to meet the projected demands of its
preference customers, issued Notices of Insufficiency to
these customers. These notices had the legal effect of
relieving load growth needs after July 1, 1983. BPA also
informed its DSI customers that it would probably not
be able to renew their power sale contracts when they
expire in the period from 1981 to 1991 since it will need
the energy "freed up" with the expiration of those contracts to meet the growing requirements of its preference customers, which, by virtue of the preference
clause, have first right to it.
Id.at 30.
29. Id.at 25. 31.
30. The-Bonneville Project Act calls for preference to public
bodies and cooperatives, and directs that the hydroelectric projects should be operated "for the benefit of the general public, and
particularly of domestic and rural consumers." 16 US.C § 832c(a
(1994). The dilemma was that the states of Idaho and Oregon.
while nch in "domestic and rural consumers," were served primarily by private utilities who had no right to preference power. H.R.
REP. No. 976, supra note 26. at 27. Gene Tollefson recounts:
On February 20. 1978 Robert Straub and John Evans, the
Governors of Oregon and idaho, respectively, declared
that BPA 'must honor the commitments in acts of
Congress that domestic and rural customers have first
call on energy from Federal dams that are even more
basic than what BPA calls preference customers.
ToL.ErsON. supra note 24. at 371. They supported creation of a
Domestic and Rural PoweriAuthority to lay claim to this power. Id.
See H.R. REP. No. 976, supra note 26, at 25-26:

Whaj
Ceme
Dawn
1isn~ng, Dam
Come Tm
'u'1O~S
The VIL
~'Then Da+
charged. Finally, large industries would have only a
portion of their load served, and that by a new class
of power of a lower quality and therefore less likely
to be claimed by preference utilities. Lawsuits were
quickly filed by political leaders in private utility service areas.32 BPA's public utility and industry cus33
tomers intervened to protect their interests.
A crisis swept the Northwest electric industry
because BPA provided more than fifty percent of all
electricity sold in the four-state area of Oregon,
Washington, Idaho and western Montana.3 4 And
electricity's availability and price significantly influenced the entire economy. California utilities were
also increasingly dependent on BPA power which
was provided to them across the large Pacific
Northwest-Pacific Southwest Intertie. The problem
was perceived to be political, and utility executives
looked to their political leadership for solutions.
BPA's fundamental dilemma was that its statutory authority included only implied authority to
acquire new resources.35 Those new resources could
only serve to "firm up" or support the more efficient

use of existing hydroelectric power. Express statutory authority to acquire new resources to meet
load was lacking.36 A major initiative was mounted

to provide BPA the statutory authority to do what
was perceived as necessary: acquire resources to
At the same time, the States are looking for ways to
qualify their residential customers for a share of ...
resources. In this respect, the State of Oregon has
formed a "Domestic and Rural Power Authority" (DRPA}
which has applied to BPA for an allocation of power
DRPA Is Intended to qualify as a preference customer in
order to obtain low cost power to serve all residential
customers throughout the State.
Sez als LI. at 30:
Additional power planning uncertainties arose on July
28. 1977, when legislation was enacted in the State of
Oregon creating the Oregon Domestic and Rural Power
Authority (DRPA). This legislation is Intended to make
the entire State of Oregon a preference customer of BPA
for the purpose of securing a pro rata share of Federal
hydro sufficient to meet the total demands of Oregon
domestic and rural consumers.
31. Governor Dixie Lee Ray of Washington declared herself
'against reallocation of our hydroelectric supplies by taking away
from Washington states" and giving It to Oregon and Idaho.
ToLEso.4 supra note 24. at 371. See aso H.R. REP. No. 976. supra
note 26. at 25, 30-31.
32. Sez H.R. R'. No. 976. supra note 26. at 30.
33. Id.
34. td. at 26.36-40.64.
35. Sez L. at 36-40 (discussing "removal of BPA restriction
on acquisition orpurchase of power to meet needs-).
36. Id. at 36. "BPA and others believe new authority for
resource acquisition is an essential piece of this legislative solution. Without such authority, BPA asserts that the amount of
power available to BPA is fixed: Id.
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meet what was felt to be burgeoning residential and
industrial load growth. These newer, albeit more
expensive resources, could be melded with lower
cost, existing hydropower to produce a uniform
class of power that would be sold at a rate that
assured the Pacific Northwest's continued econom37
ic prosperity.
III. The Northwest Power Act: A Study In Public
Benefits and Entitlements
A. Setting The Scene
The Northwest Power Act did not have to be the
lengthy, technical, complex law that was enacted.
Some envisioned it as a one-sentence bill expressly
authorizing BPA to acquire new power to serve growing load.38 But that would have been far too easy and
far too logical. More importantly, it would not have
met the stakeholders' deep-seated desire to guarantee in law all of their existing benefits and, if possible, lay claim to a few more. In the process, old entitlements were ratified and new ones created.
Like a "ponzi" scheme, these entitlements
could be paid for only so long as BPKs sales generated adequate revenues. With the passage of the
Energy Policy Act of 1992, 39 BPA's position as the
preeminent power wholesaler in the Pacific
Northwest was significantly eroded. Competition
and access to lower cost, alternative resources
brought load loss. 40 Load loss and additional commitments of water for Endangered Species Act purposes led to reduced revenues. With revenues
reduced it became increasingly difficult to both
repay the Treasury and support the entitlements
and benefits. Together with extraordinarily high levels of debt from earlier failed nuclear projects,41
BPA is faced with a financial crisis. 42
The future, however, was not so clear in 1978
when the Northwest Power Act was first proposed.
The late U.S. Senator Henry M. "Scoop" Jackson was
the senior statesman responsible for overseeing
BPA. As Chairman of the Senate Energy and
Environmental Affairs Committee, Jackson com37. BPA power sales reflect the nature of the power firm,
non-firm, and others. They are not tied to the generation from
which the power is produced. BPA rates are melded and set to
recover the total costs, including amortization of federal base
system. Id.at 68, 87.
38. Discussions of author with Robert Ratcliffe, former
General Counsel and Deputy Administrator, Bonneville Power
Administration, during the pendency of the Northwest Power Act
before Congress, in Portland, Oregon, mid-1979.
39. Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776 (1992).

40. See BPA 1994 ANN. REP.,
supra note 4; BPA 1995 ANN. REP.,
supra note 4. See also Anthony Effinger, Up Against It, BPA Learns How
to Compete, OREGONIAN, Mar. 24, 1996, at BI ("IBPA Administratorl
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manded the power and the respect of the regions
utility and industry leaders. As a primary author of
the National Environmental Policy Ad:, he was also
a statesman with credibility among environmental
advocates. More importantly, perhaps, was the fact
that 80 percent of the power sold in "Scoop's" home
state was sold by BPA. In a very real sense, the economy of the State of Washington was linked to BPA
prosperity. With Jackson's former chief of staff
Sterling Munro serving as BPA's Administrator, and
a full blown crisis of too little power and too much
load, the stage was set.
BPA's customers carefully weighed their
options. Under the best case scenario, some but not
all could have an administrative allocation of power
to meet part of their load, and be left to acquire
additional resources themselves. 43 This would
require risk and the expenditure of capital: the risk
of building resources and the cost of selling bonds,
These were not happy prospects for elected utility
commissioners, nor for private utilities and industries which understandably prefer to keep debt low.
Under the worst case alternative, they would get no
BPA power and be required to acquire all new, higher cost resources. Alternatively, BPA could acquire
additional resources for everyone. This would create
new federal agency debt, which would not appear
on BPA customer ledger sheets. Hopefully, it would
also reduce the overall cost of resources by continuing with one primary supplier. The savings would
be passed along to BPA customers. Now here was
an attractive alternative. It did not take a rocket scientist to determine which way the political winds
were likely to blow.
BPA customers, however, were a suspicious lot.
They wanted the benefits, but they did not trust a
strong BPA. They feared that the new resource
acquisition authority would make the Administrator
a "power czar" which could lead to his Ireating them
unfairly.44 Accordingly, they took every opportunity
to reduce this risk by specifying, in excruciating
detail, exactly what the Administrator could and
could not do. Their attempt was to limit the flexibilHardy, a 20-year veteran of the power industry, said his darkest
days came one week last April when customers accounting for
200 megawatts of power worth $50 million in annual sales abandoned the BPA.").
41. See BPA 1994 ANN. REP., supra note 4; WPPSS PROIECTS
Nos. I & 3, supra note 26.
, s42. See generally BPA 1994 ANN. REP., supra note 4, BPA 1995
ANN. REP., supra note 4.
43. See H.R. REP. No. 976, supra note 26, at 31.
44. See lames 0. Luce & Janet W. McLenran, Acquisition of
Energy Resources Under the Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and
ConservationAct: A Look at the Future, 5 U..PUGEr SOUND L. REv. 61,96
(1981).
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ity and discretion that Congress had originally
entrusted to BPA under the Bonneville Project Act
and earlier laws, a discretion which had been used
to help put them in business but was now seen as
45
too far-reaching.
B. Put on the Handcuffs and Pour the Gravy Over
the Grits: The Story of the Northwest Power Act
BPA's customers set about their task with zeal
and enthusiasm. BPA could acquire the resources
they needed but the resources would be of two
classes: major and non-maor.46 For major
resources, BPA was required to undertake a complex and lengthy process of hearings with the final
decision being entrusted to the Northwest Power
Planning Council, 47 an interstate compact created
by Congress to prepare a power and fish and wildlife
mitigation plan.48 The only appeal from a Council
recommendation not to acquire a major resource
was to Congress, 49 and it was presumed that if the
Governor's representatives would not approve a
resource, that decision would not be overturned in
Washington D.C.
The customers did not stop with resource acquisition authority. That was only the spnng board.
Each special interest group had its own set of
non-negotiable benefits. All customers, especially
the Idaho Power Company. were leery of BPNs ability to set rates. Accordingly, they persuaded Senator
lames McClure (R-ID) to specify in detail the rate
process to be used. 50 The ability to act quickly to
45. For example. Congressman Weaver (D-OR), the leading
opponent of the Northwest Power Act, opposed the legislation
for several reasons, induding distrust of BPA. On November 12.
1980. in debate before the House of Representatives, he stated:
INlo consensus exists. Mr. Chairman ... The four public
utilities in Oregon oppose the bill strongly. The Eugene
Water and Electric Board, the largest public utility in
Oregon, adamantly and strongly opposes the bill.
Under this bill ... initiative by the Eugene Water and
Electric Board would be destroyed. ... [it] empowers an
existing Federal bureaucracy-the Bonneville Power
Administration--with vast new powers to mandate any
proiect that this Federal agency decided upon ...
What this bill is about is simply to empower the
Bonneville Power Administration to mandate to all utilities whatever this Federal bureaucrat decided upon.
126 CONG. Rc. HiO.517 (daily ed. Nov. 12, 1980) (statement of
Rep. Weaver). Congressman Weaver was not beyond taking
license with the facts to argue his point. The distrust of BPA's new
powers, however, was very real.
46. 16 U.S.C. § 839(a)(12) (1994). For an analysis of resource
acquisition authority under the Northwest Power Act, see Luce &
McLennan. supra note 44. at 61-97.
47. 16 U.S.C. § 839d(c) (1994).
48. See Luce & McLennan. supra note 44. at 83-86.
49. 16 U.S.C. § 939d(c)(3) (1994).
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respond to changing circumstances was taken away.
Lengthy processes were established. The private
utilities argued that BPA rate procedures should be
at least the equivalent of those they faced at State
Public Utility Commissions to create a level playing
field. 51 The standard of review for rates was set
-accordingly, and the statute attempted to specify
exactly what costs could be borne by which rate
groups, or 'pools."2 Not surprisingly, the "new
resource" rate for those not already a part of the BPA
system would be the highest. 53
Public utilities wanted to make sure that their
preference to BPA power would be protected, and
they were not adverse to putting a damper on the
ability of others to form new public utilities or to
solidify their ability to hang onto their own local
industry by establishing BPA rate structures that
would make it uneconomical for large industry to
move.54 They also wanted assurances that they
alone would be entitled to the benefits of the "federal base system" that existed on the date of the
passage of the Act. In other words, all existing, presumably low-cost resources would be reserved for
them, with preference extended to include not only
supply but also price.55
Private utilities, on the other hand. argued that
their consumers should not be disadvantaged byan
outdated preference concept that was intended to
allow public utilities to get into business 40 years
earlier, but which had long since served its purpose.
They would give public utilities a continued right to
50. See the remarks of Senator lames McClure (R-ID) on
August 3. 1979, and the colloquy between Senators McClure.
Jackson (D-WA). and Magnuson (D-WA.) on ratemaking procedures. 125 Cc;on. REc. S1 1,594-97 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1979). The rate
provisions of the Northwest Power Act are set forth at 16 U.S.C
839e (1994). See discuon regarding ratesettingprocedures nfra
Set aLso S. REs. No. 272.96th Cong.. 1st Sess. 56-79 (1979). The latter document details the tvislon" of the drafters regarding rates.
51.16 U.S.C. § 838e (1994).
52. Id.
53. The new resources rate is charged to "new large single
loads" that exceed l0 average megawatts. Itwas designedwith the
expectation that such loads would be charged the highest possible BPA rate because. it was assumed, only high-cost resources
would be Inthe pool from which such rates were calculated. 16
U.S.C. § 839e (1994); H.R. REP. No. 976. supra note 26, at 53.
54. See H.R. REP. No. 976, suira note 26. at 53.
55. See 16 U.S.C. § 839c(b) (1994): H.R. REP No. 976. supra
note 26, at 33-35. The latter document's discussion entitled
"Protection of the Preference Clause" makes it dear that the
Committee did not intend to change preference:
ITIhe Intention of this Committee is clear. The
Committee does not want to undo nearly 80 years of history ... . Specific provisions ... are designed to protect

the entitlement of both existing and new preference customers to the full federal base system. These provisions
seek to protect preference as to both supply and price.
Id.at 34.
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preference, but they insisted on rate parity for their
residential and farm consumers, many of whom
paid rates several times greater than their public
utility counterparts.5 6 BPA would be required to
undertake a "paper power exchange" of its low-cost
power for their higher cost power' 7 The dollars
would be passed along to their domestic and rural
consumers in the form of a new benefit. The public
utilities agreed so long as, utilizing a complicated
set of assumptions, their ratepayers would never be
disadvantaged.' 8 The private utilities agreed. They
also agreed with the public utilities on the inherently anti-competitive scheme that would deter
large industry from leaving its existing service territory, and discourage new industry from coming to
9
the Pacific Northwest if it used BPA power'
Direct service industries, primarily large aluminum companies, would receive new contracts
with an improved quality of service, relinquish any
claim they had to taking service directly from their
local utility, and help pay for many of the public and
private utility benefits by paying higher rates.6° The
top quartile, or top 25 percent of their load, would
receive better service, and there would be fewer
restrictions on the balance of the load.61 They would
also conserve energy, and assure a continued pres62
ence in the Pacific Northwest as BPA customers.
The traditional BPA stakeholder base was, for
the first time, supplemented by new players: fish

and wildlife advocates, and conservation interests
who urged that the cheapest "new resource" was "no
resource" but instead a concerted effort to reduce
load by conserving power. They saw the BPA's
predicament as an opportunity to gain a seat at a
table to which they perceived they had long been
denied access. BPA could become a powerful and
effective funder of their special needs, and serve as
a laboratory for proving that environmental benefits
and conservation initiatives could complement a
63

56. 16 U.S.C. § 839c(c) (1994).
57. Id.BPA may also meet its -exchange obligation" by providing "in lieu of purchasing any amount of ... power" offered by
an exchanging utility, "an equivalent amount of electnc power
from other sources ... if the cost of such acquisition is less than
the cost of purchasing the electric power offered by such utility'
as part of the exchange. 16 U.S.C. § 839c(c)(5) (1994). In the contracts BPA signed with the exchanging utilities to implement the
Regional Act. BPA arguably limited its ability to use this "in lieu"
right. See BPA Contract No. DE-MS79-81BP9, § 4 (Aug. 22, 1981).
58. 16 U.S.C. § 839e(b)(2) (1994). See also H.R. REP. No. 976,
supra note 26, at 35.
59. See H.R. REP. No. 976, supra note 26, at 43-44. This was a
second reason for the new large, single load provision. Some
members of Congress were apprehensive that BPA power would
attract industry from their region to the Pacific Northwest. See id.
The discussion is entitled "The bill's impact on other regions."
60. As noted in House Report 976:
These industnes will also pay significantly higher rates
under the new contracts. These higher rates permit the
Administrator to enter into contracts with the region's
investor-owned utilities foran exchange of power.... By
providing these residential customers wholesale rate
parity with residential customers of preference utilities,
the amendment serves in a substantial way to cure a
maior part of the allocation problem.
H.R. REP. No. 976, supra note 26, at 29. Not mentioned but also
important was the fact that the residential exchange also undercut the formation of any new public utilities. There is no eco-

nomic incentive for new publicly owned utilities Ifprivate utilities
can provide the same power costs without public ownership, Id,
61. See the discussion of the aluminum company power service and accompanying legislative history of the Northwest Power
Act found in Aluminum Company of America v. Central Lincoln
People's Util. Dist., 467 U.S, 380 (1984), reversing an earlier decision by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals on similar Issues, The
case is important both because of the excellent history of the BPA
and the Northwest Power Act, and because it grants the BPA
Administrator very significant deference in Interpreting the
statute. Id.at 391. Ironically, the court granted BPA precisely the
broad discretion that the BPA customers had scught to deny the
Administrator. Id.
62. H.R. REP. No. 976, supra note 26, at 63, "Additionally,
since the linchpin of this legislation is conserval Ion and regional
planning, the committee expects that the DSI's will do their part
to conserve energy... "Id.
63. In the fish and wildlife area, an entire "bill within a bill"
is constructed in § 4(h), 16 U.S.C. § 839h 11994), The BPA
Administrator is to use the BPA fund, created under the authority of the Transmission System Act, to directly fund fish and
wildlife measures which "protect. mitigate, and enhance fish and
wildlife to the extent affected by the developmernt and operation"
of federal hydroelectric proiects. 16 U.S.C. § 839h(10(A) (1994),
By using the BPA fund, appropriations are not required and the
BPA ratepayers act as benefit providers for fish and wildlife
through their rates. Similarly, the BPA fund Is used to fund conservation which, in addition, is given a distinct competitive
advantage through the Acts "cost effective' definition. 16 USC,§
839a(41(A) (1994).

large utility.

Conservation leaders, particularly the Natural
Resources Defense Council, saw BPA as a model
among large utilities for testing the concept that
conservation should be considered a resource
because it served to reduce the need for new generating resources that otherwise would have to have
been built. Fish and wildlife advocates at federal,
state, and tribal level found a friend in
Congressman John Dingle (D-MI). Congressman
Dingle held Senator Jackson's bill, S. 885, hostage
before the House Commerce Committee until there
was agreement that the Bonneville fund should be
used to "protect, mitigate, and enhance" fish and
wildlife affected by the development and operation
of the Federal Columbia River Power System. This
was an extremely powerful tool because it allowed
fish and wildlife to be funded directly, without the
usual checks and balances inherent in the appropri-
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ations process.6 And there were few limits to such
65
expenditures prescribed by law.
Finally, the region's four states of Washington,
Oregon, Idaho, and Montana asserted a state role in
what had been viewed as a solely federal enterprise.
They insisted upon and won the creation of the
Northwest Power Planning Council. an interstate
compact entrusted with planning responsibilities for
BPA's future in power and fish and wildlife matters."

The Council, as noted ab6ve, plays a major role in
power planning, although its presence has been
most significantly felt through its fish and wildlife
program. The Council's program is heavily influenced
by federal and state fish and wildlife agencies and
tribes.67 It "guides" but does not "direct" BPA
actions.6 If its programs had resulted in the envisioned "doubling" goal for anadromous fish, victory
would have been declared.69 In fact, however, the fish

64. Most federal agencies appropriations must go through a
normal appropriations process. BPA is different. Its budget
process is far more abbreviated. The Federal Columbia River
Transmission System Act provides that-

unreasonably and Ineffectually Interfered with fish and wildlife
mitigation under the ESA. and that since the BPA ratepayers pay
directly for these programs through their rates, as opposed to the
appropriations process, the Northwest should have an increased
say in this area. See No.-Tusr P w CouciiL. DErr REior
P oposALs roR FIsH AHD iLoLiFE Gmm:.ce 3-4.

[The Administrator may make] expenditures from the
[Bonneville) fund. which shall have been included in his
annual budget submitted to Congress, without further
appropriation and without fiscal year limitation, but
within such specific directives, or limitations as may be
included in appropriation acts, for any purpose necessary or appropriate to carry out the duties imposed upon
the Administrator pursuant to law.
16 U.S.C.2 § 838i(b) (1994). Thus. in a real sense, the burden is
shifted.
Rather than BPA having to win affirmative approval for
expenditures, Congress must disapprove or limit proposed
expenditures. There are, however, limitations. In the fish and
wildlife area, for example. BPA must obtain express congressional approval for capital expenditures for capital projects 'vith an
estimated life of greater than 15 years and an estimated cost of at
least $1.0O0.000." 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(10l)(B) (1994). when the
BPKs Transmission System Act provision regarding an abbreviated appropriations process was enacted, its purpose was to make
BPAa better business partner within the utility community. it was
believed that transmission projects could not be readily financed
if they were subiect to the vaganes of annual appropriations. See
also H.R. REP. No. 976, supra note 26, at 24.
65. 16 U.S.C. § 839bch)l10)AHC) (1994). BRA is to fund all
such costs on a 'system wide basis." Id. § 839h(l0}(C). See H.R.
REP. No. 976. supra note 26. at 44-49 (detailing fish and wildlife
needs). Congressman Dingle (R-MI) was the Chairman of the
House Commerce Committee. See also the remarks of Chairman
Dingle on November 17. 1980 explaining the fish and wildlife provisions. 126 CONG. Rc. HIO,682-84 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1980)
(statement of Chairman Dingle).
Such limits as are anticipated by law have not always been
-asserted. For example, the law states that 'expenditures of the
Administrator...shall be in addition to, not in lieu of. other expenditures authorized or required from other entities under other
agreements of law.' 16 U.S.C. § 839b[h)[ 10)(A) (1994). The provision
was intended to assure that the BPA ratepayers would not pay for
costs which were a pre-existing obligation of another agency, such
as a state or federal fish and wildlife agency. The law also appears
to contemplate that at some point in time the mitigation obligation
of the Administrator for impacts caused by the construction of the
federal hydroelectric projects will have been satisfied, although a
continuing obligation for operation of the dams will remain. Id.
66. See 16 U.S.C. § 839b[a)(l) (1994). See also H.R. REP. No.
976, supra note 26. at 52-59. The regional control or'governance
issue emerged again as a major issue with § 508(c) of H.R. 1905.
and the accompanying Conference Report, calling for a Council
study to advise the Congress on the best means to achieve
greater regional control of fish and wildlife efforts. The Governors'
policy goal in 1980 was to assure the states a role In planning a
coordinated electric energy future, and in protecting fish and
wildlife. Their frustration in 1995 is different and In many ways
greater. They believe that the federal government has at times

67. By law, the Council must adopt the recommendations of
the state and federal fish and wildlife agencies and tribes, or
explain In writing why such recommendations are not adopted.
16 US.C. § 839b(h}(7) (1994). The issue Is made more complicated by a recent court decision, NRIC v. Council, 35 F3d 1371 (9th
Cir. 1994). There, the court opined In obiferdkela:
We conclude that 839bih) binds, more than unleashes.
the Council's discretion with respect to fish and wildlife
Issues. Indeed, we are convinced that the fish and
wildlife provisions of the NPA and their legislative history require that a high degree of deference be given to
fishery managers' interpretations of such provsions and
their recommendations for program measures.
Id.at 1388.
68. BPA Is guided by the Council's Program and while it must
act 'conslstenr with the Program it Is not legally obligated to fulfill all of Its proAslons. 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h}(l l](A)(i) (1994). From
time to time, the Coundl proposes measures which BPA elects not
to Implement. although this Is rare. One bright line Issue, however. is economic mitigation. The Council has from time to time
urged BPA to compensate property owners and irrigators for
Impacts caused by operating the reseivoirs in a manner the
Council believed helped fish migration, such as "dravang down'
the reservolrs to see whether the changed water conditions would
benefit fish. BPA has declined to pay economic mitigation, arguing
that its ratepayer's obligation s limited to "protect, mitigate, and
enhance' fish and wildlife, not to make economic restitution. The
provision fin the NMFS B.O.] regarding John Day anticipates economic mitigation from some source. However funding for such.
mitigation must come from a source other than BPA: BPA lacks
authority to provide such economic mitigation. Memorandum
from Harvard P Spigal, General Counsel, to Randall V. Hardy
Administrator. Bonneville Power Administration (Aug. 12. 1995):
Memorandum from James O. Luce. AsststantGeneral Counsel, and
Philip S. Key, Attorney, to Randall W. Hardy. Administrator.
Bonneville Power Administration (Mar. 9. 1995).
69. In fairness, some significant gains have been made.
Upriver steelhead runs Increased from an average run of 124,000
In the later half of the 1970s to an average of 363.000 fish in the
later half of the 1980s. Upnver bright fall chinook runs increased
from an average of 88,000 In the early 1980 to an average run of
299,000 in the late 1980s. The upriver spring chinook runs
Increased from an average run of 55,000 in the early 1980s to an
average run of 97,000 in the late 1980s. See Dr.Atsr0F
o i
?O,
DOE-BP1-1880. TcHw;:cAz, Apeuom CK&iM;G A CouPsE FOR mHF
FuruRE 38 (1992). While a continuing drought. El Nifio weather
patterns, an unrelenting ocean and inriver haivest have since
depressed those numbers, real progress has been made.
The key policy dilemma Is between the Endangered Species
Act goal of saving species at almost any cost. and the Council's
Implementation of the Northwest Power Acts goal of 'doubling
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and wildlife program has failed to produce anything
near its anticipated benefits.70 While supporting the
largest, most expensive fish initiative in the United
States, some fish runs, especially in the Snake River,
have plummeted. 71 This has led to what Congress
had assumed would not be needed-listings under
the Endangered Species Act of 1978.72 It has also,
together with other significant factors explained
73
below, exacerbated BPKs financial condition.
These new Northwest Power Act benefits and
entitlements were additive to those already existing
under earlier law for irrigation, and other non-hydro
purposes 7 4 BPA is to set rates that allow it to timely
repay the debt to the United States Treasury, and otherwise act "consistent with sound business principles."7 5 The annual repayment obligation can be

deferred in times of fiscal crisis, but that is politically
risky and invites increasing control of BPA affairs by
Congress, the Office of Management and Budget, and
other beltway overseers within the Administration.7 6
The inevitable consequence was that BPA could
only pay for these benefits so long as all of the Act's
the runs." The only way to "double the runs" is through increased
reliance on hatchery programs and it is those very hatchery runs
which are argued to adversely affect wild fish genetics. Thus, the
new Council goal is to "accomplish rebuilding efforts without loss
of biological diversity." See NORTHWEST POWER PLANNING COUNCIL,
COLUMBIA RIVER FISH & WILDLIFE PROGRAM 4-4 (1994).
70. The Program's success has been limited, in part, because
the Council has authority to guide only the federal hydro entities:
the BPA, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Bureau of Reclamation,
and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. 16 U.S.C. §
839b(h)(l I)(A) (1994). There is no authority to require the multitude of other federal agencies, such as National Manne Fishenes
Service, the Forest Service, the Bureau of Land Management, and
others to "exercise Itheir responsibilities, taking into account at
each relevant stage of decisionmaking processes to the fullest
extent practicable, the program adopted by the Council." 16 U.S.C.
§ 839b(h)(I 1)(A)(ii) (1994). Attention is needed in the forthcoming
"regional review" and the governance inquiry called for by H.R.
1905. supra note 66, to correct this deficiency. The impacts of harvest, habitat, hatcheries, and hydro need to be looked at in an integrated way if there is to be a chance for real progress.
71. See National Marine Fisheries Service, Federal Columbia
River Power Systenvransportation Biological Opinion 1-4 (1995)
(noting that the current population of spring summer chinook is
0.5% of its histoncal abundance, and that the Snake River sockeye are functionally extinct, with only one fish returning to Red
Fish Lake in 1994).
72. Id. See also Review of Status of Upriver Columbia River
Basin Populations of Pacific Salmon and Steelhead Trout, 43 Fed.
Reg. 45,628 (1978).
73. See BPA 1995 Ann. Rep., supra note 4. at 27.
74.
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WP-93-FS-BPA-02, FINAL RATE PROPOSAL 93-104 (1993) (discussing "Revenue Requirement Theory and Methodology") [hereRATE
PROPOSAL]. BPA is obligated to pay 'fals
Inafter BPA FINAL
the portion of construction costs
required by Pub. L. 89-4488 ...
at Federal reclamation projects that is beyond the repayment
ability of the irrigators." Id.at 102-03.
75. Id. at 93-94.

assumptions withstood the test of time. Foremost
among these assumptions was that BPA was the
benevolent power marketing agency from whom
most everyone purchased power. As shown below,
the assumptions had limited staying power.
The ultimate irony of the Northwest Power Act is
that less than six months after its passage, it was
shown not to have been needed. The load forecasts
upon which the need for the law had been built
turned positive when utility economists finally recognized that the laws of price elasticity applied to electricity. There was more than enough power to serve
BPAs customer needs for the foreseeable future1 7 In
fact, there was so much power that the major
Washington Public Power, Supply System nuclear
prolects, begun before the Act was passed and far
78
over budget, were with one exception, terminated.
In the end, a strong case can be made that the Act
proves once again the adage that "if it's too good to
be true, it probably is." Ironically, the Act's most vocal
critic, Congressman James Weaver (D-OR), was cor79
rect in arguing that the law was not nec:essary.
76. See Corm'. REP. No. 293, 104th Cong., IstSess. (1995)
(report accompanying H.R. 1905). The conferces to the Water
Development Appropriations Bill for fiscal year note that:
Recent actions by the Bonneville Power Administration
have led to concerns that the IBPAI may not make its
Treasury payment in fiscal year 1996. The conferees cannot state more strongly that failure .,to make the full
annual payment to Treasury will seriously jeopardlze Its
credibility with Congress and lead to more Involvement
by Congress in the management and decislonmaking of
the agency.
Id. at 74.
ihe Parity Promise;A Perspective
77. See Michael Blumm, Fulfilling
on Scientific Proof, Economic Cost, and Indian Treaty Rilhis In theApproval
Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Program, 13 ErJvrL. L. 103, 104,
of the
1980
148 (1982). Professor Blumm correctly observes that "Illn
substantial electric energy deficits were projected for the Pacific
Northwest for the foreseeable future ... Only two years later,
however, the Bonneville Power Administration Is now projecting
at
electric surpluses throughout the remainder of the 1980s." Id,
156 n.2. Professor Blumm also cites as authority the rapidly
,
changing load forecasts that occurred In this tim 3 frame that gave
rise to the surplus of electricity. Id. at 148 n.197, The single
biggest factor for this turnaround was the recognition that electricity consumption is price-elastic, a position which was not
generally accepted when the load forecasts that supported the
need for the Northwest Power Act were prepared. Id.
78. See WPPSS PROJECTS Nos. I & 3, supra note 26, at 8-18.
79. See 126 CoNG. REc. H10,674 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1980)
(remarks of Congressman Weaver):
The fight is ending. It has lasted almost 4 years. Why was
it necessary to put up this great fight against the
Northwest power bill?...
...This bill is not even needed. BPA alre3dy has the
authority to do conservation. BPA already has the
authority to do allocation.... What they do need the bill
for the proponents do not mention. That is the forced
financing of thermal plants.
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IV. Mistaken Assumptions: How Could So Many
Be So Wrong About So Much?
The question remains: "How could so many be
so wrong about so much?" The answer, it is submitted, is that we are not as visionary as we like to
think, and greedier than we care to admit. The "we"
in this case is BPA, its customers, and public interest groups, all of whom benefit from or are stakeholders in BPXs future. The admonition that "for
whom the bell tolls, it tolls for thee," was never more
correct. While Congress shares the responsibility, it
largely enacted what it was asked to pass into law.
Regional legislation does not become law without
widespread consensus among affected stakeholders, and the Northwest Power Act is no exception.
Hopefully, all parties have learned. Trusting the
BPA may be perceived as risky business, but the lesson of the Northwest Power Act is that it is far riskier to adopt legislation, which over time and through
changed circumstances, threatens to starve the very
goose that lays the golden eggs which benefit you.
Ironically, the original Bonneville Project Act, with
its broad flexibility, would likely suffice to meet all
of today's needs if the political process effectively
translated the message to Bonneville and the
Administrator. And if the message fails to translate,
there is always the next election.
A. The Assumptions in 1980
The Act begins from a well-intentioned but
arrogant premise: that its authors and contributors
are sufficiently clairvoyant as to be able to predict
the future -,itha high degree of certainty. The facts,
however, are substantially different. As noted, the
core assumption concerning the desperate need for
more power was proven wrong only shortly after the
ink had dried on the new law.8 0
Of 10 key assumptions, none have withstood
the test of time:
1. Assumption: BPKs customers badly
needed new power resources to serve a
80. See Blumm, supra note 77. at 148 n.197.
81. See H.R. RE. No. 976, supra note 26, at 23-32; S. REP. No.
272. supra note 50, at 18.
82. For a discussion of the business changes in the electric
industry that have affected BPA competitiveness, and its ability to
raise rates, see BPA BusiNEss PL~t FEIS.supra note 5.at 1-1. 1-2.
83. The breakup is the result of a series of legal changes and
engineenng advances, some of which preceded passage of the
Northwest Power Act. The first of these new laws was the Public
Utility Regulatory Policy Act of 1978 (PURPA) and Its requirement
that utilities purchase QF" resources. PURPA lump-started the
independent power produang industry, and made It economically attractive to begin to develop resource alternatives to central
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rapidly growing load, BPA was best able to
provide them. and the Northwest Power
Act would facilitate that happening8i
Fact: Before the Regional Act became
law, significant deficits were forecast. as
inevitable. Shortly after the Acts passage,
the broadly recognized and regionally supported "white book" of loads and resources
changed to recognize the laws of price elasticity and showed BPA and the region surplus through the 1980s. In the intervening
16 years, BPA has used the Northwest Power
Acrs § 6(c) procedures to acquire only
1385aMW. 580 of which are conservation.
The levelized cost of these resources varied
from less than 30 mills/kwh for conservation
to far more. The largest resource contract
signed by BPA was the Tenaska Project for a
242 average megawatt combustion turbine
at a cost of 39.5 mills per kilowatt-hour,
which could escalate. Due to frustration of
purpose, BPA has since withdrawn its participation in the project. Tenaska has filed
suit seeking $1.000.000.000 in damages, and
the case is in arbitration.
2. Assumptlon: The utility industry
would continue as a regulated monopoly
with BPA as-the central hub for providing
wholesale power marketing and transmission to most Pacific Northwest utilities.
This would happen because BPA rates
would be substantially lower than those
offered by competitors.82
Fact- The deregulation movement that
began with the airline and communications industries in the mid-1980s has
expanded to the utility industry.8 3 The passage of the Public Utility Regulatory Policy
Act of 1978 and the Energy Policy Act of
1992 brought about a sea of change.
Additionally, technological efficiencies
achieved in combustion turbine engineerstation generation. Efficiency breakthroughs In the combustion
engine area. In part because of PURPA and In part because of the
search for Inaeased efficiency In airplane engines, began to make
economic Inroads Into BPA's dominant position In the market
This was accompanied by significant new discovenes of natural
gas, the decline In the fuel costs for combustion turbines, and

efficiency Increases which became Inaeasingly attractive to the
electric industy. Finally, there was the Energy Policy Act of 1992.
The statute has particular significance for BPA Inasmuch as the
statute Is at the heart of the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission's mega-NOPRs on Open Access Transmission and
Recovery of Stranded Costs by. Public Utilities. Docket Nos.
RM95-8-O00 and R1,194-7-001, 70 FERC 61,357 (March 29, 1995).
Sc ao Solvelg Torvik. Dirtgubailbn Forces BPA Into Identity Crisis.
SEArI.E PoS-ltaMUtcNcU. OcL 10, 1995. at 1.
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Ing and major new natural gas discoveries
opened the door to competition in the
wholesale power market. The deregulation
of transmission has led to increased wheeling of power on the BPA Intertie and maingrid. 84 The competitiveness movement to
transform BPA from a government agency
to something more closely approaching a
private utility85 led BPA to agree to free
many of its customers from their contracts
to take service from others.8 As this happened, BPA rates absorbed increasing
nuclear, fish and wildlife, and residential
exchange costs, rising significantly.8 7 This
occurred at the very time that the competition's prices plunged as gas markets collapsed. Not surprisingly, the result is that
BPA has lost more than 700 MW of load out
of a total of approximately 8000 MW of firm
load in the last year, and some of BPAs
large public agency and industrial customers may leave BPA or, at best, will
diversify and further reduce their BPA load.

Fact: The strategy worked for a very
short while. Canadians drilled for oil in
Alberta. They found no oil but discovered
vast amounts of gas. California's prosperity
cycled down to a major recession and
demand for power dropped. Resources
constructed in the Southwest to meet
anticipated load growth were no longer
needed. BPA's fish protection effoits resulted in increasing amounts of spill from
hydroelectric projects, stretching from
May-August. This further drove down the
price of BPA power, as would.-be purchasers knew that a large amount of "fish
power" would come onto the market at very
low prices. With the Intertie now increasingly open to all who would wheel because
of the spirit of deregulation, the Intertie
could be loaded with cheap "fish flush"
electricity when it was most needed to run
southwest airconditioners. BPA revenues
from extra-regional sales plunged. 8' The
California gold mine was gone.

3. Assumption: Electricity prices would
remain high. This would assure a steady
stream of revenues from eager California
purchasers who would purchase clean
hydro power to avoid further aggravating
air quality problems and running expensive
thermal generation. This California gold
mine would help pay for the many public
benefits and entitlements contained within
the Northwest Power Act.

4. Assumption: Private utilities would
need new power sources. They would place
substantial firm power load upon BPA,
rather than acquiring their own resources,
because it was cost effective. These sales
would provide BPA revenues and help BPA
meet its bottom line. This would also hold
down the costs of the residential exchange
program which benefited private utility
customers and help pay for the large con-

84. Theoretically. BPA's transmission services could be a
money maker even in a deregulated environment. However, the
Transmission System Act of 1974 requires BPA to provide transmission services at cost, 16 U.S.C. § 839(g), (h) (1994). and the
mega-NOPR's rules on comparability also could foreclose this
opportunity to the extent they are applied to BPA.

choice in the region, not a supplier by force. Petitioners, on the
other hand, prefer to see BPA hold its customeis' feet to the fire
and strictly enforce all terms and conditions of its contracts,

85. See BPA BUSINESS PLAN FEIS, supra note 5. BPA has elected the "Market Driven BPA" as its proposed alternative and
describes it as requiring that "BPA ...
change its programs to try
and achieve its mission while competing in the deregulated electnc power market ...
[becoming] ...
a more active participant in
the competitive market for power, transmission, and energy services." Id. at § 2.2. See also id. at §§ 2.2, 2.4.4.1-2 (discussing
Transmission and the impact of the Energy'Policy Act of 1992).
86. Idaho Rivers United v. Bonneville Power Administration,
No. 95-70340 (9th Cir., April 25, 1995) (case dismissed).
Petitioners, a coalition of environmental groups and Indian
tribes, sued BPA alleging that BPA's agreement to release some
utility and industrial customers from certain obligations under
their power sales contracts would cause BPA to lose revenue and
therefore result in less dollars being available to fund fish and
wildlife. BPA granted these waivers, in part, because of a belief
that It makes better business sense to use the carrot rather than
the stick. That is,
BPA wants to be the electnc power supplier of

The case was never briefed. Petitioners filed a motion to
withdraw the suit, and the case was subsequently dismissed,
Nevertheless, the lawsuit highlights the continuing controversy
that surrounds different business strategies BPA may employ to
maintain its financial health, as well as the delicate balance
between BPA's role as a competitive business and BPA's role as an
environmental steward and surrogate tax collector for environmental prolects.
87. See BPA 1994 ANN. REP.,
supra note 4, at 19. "BPA raised
wholesale power rates an average 15 percent to start fiscal year
"
1994 ...
Id. However. conditions which include a prolonged
drought, river operations for fish, and slumping ndustry sales, to
mention but three resulted in actual revenues that were $117 million short of the proiected revenues of $2,313 million. BPAs
financial condition is expected to Improve in 1996. See BPA 1995
Ann. Rep., supra note 4, at 21.
88. BPA 1994 ANN. REP..supra note 4, at 17. The extended
drought conditions, fish operations, and a continuing California
recession in a market where there is already surplus capacity
were major factors in the decline of BPA extra-r,.gional revenues
from a $196 million in 1991 to $76 million in 1994,
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servation programs and fish and wildlife
efforts that were envisioned under the
Northwest Power Act. Since the private
utilities would be purchasing from BPA,
they would also be effectively guided by
the policy decisions of the Northwest
Power Planning Council, thus bringing
public, pnvate, and industrial electric planning under one central planning forurn for
the entire Pacific Northwest.
Fact: The Northwest Power Act
imposed noobligation on private utilities
to purchase power from BPA, and when it
became apparent shortly after the Act's
passage that the Pacific Northwest had a
power surplus instead of a power deficit,
they chose not to do so. However, BPA was
still required to offer residential exchange
contracts to the investor owned utilities.
This increased BPA costs by $2,445,000,000
from 1980 to 1995 and effectively precluded
the formation of any new public utilities
who would be more likely to purchase from
BPA. The private utilities could also attract
new industry without the need to use BPA
power, thereby avoiding the "new large single load" rate that their public utility counterparts were forced to charge if they had
no resources of their own. Investor-owned
utilities also took advantage of BPA conservation programs, and were additionally
benefited during this time period. Finally,
because the private utilities placed little
load on BPA, they effectively were excused
from compliance with the Northwest Power
Council's Fish and Wildlife Program. These
programs placed additional costs on BPA.
making it less competitive with private utilities.
5. Assumption: Preference customers
would continue to purchase approximately
the same amount of power, if not more,
from BPA than they had prior to the Act's
passage. They would not acquire their own
resources because BPA resource acquisition was more economical and less risky.
Fact: It is risky to make broad generalizations about BPA customers, especially
preference customers. Some are large and
enjoy significant economic power, while
89. See § 7 of Contract No. DE-MS79-84BP. dated February
7, 1984, between BPA and "metered requirements" and "computed requirements" customers.
90. See BPA Suplus Dealwith Clank ColUs; PUD Turns to IOUs.,
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others are small with little industrial or consumer base. Some own their own resources,

but others are wholly dependent upon BPA.
Many of BPA's small, full requirements
preference customers remain with BPA
because they lack ready alternatives or
remain faithful to the concept of public
power as a sound policy. Partial requirements customers, and larger public agencies
with economic power, are far less committed.
Many maintained load on BPA only so long
as it was in their economic interest to do so.
Then, to take advantage of lower gas prices,
they began to look for ways to leave BPA.
Because BPA was in deficit in 1994,
public utility contracts arguably allowed
some to leave on one year's notice, or
reduce their BPA load.89 Several were
allowed to reduce load and others want to
follow.90 They are lured by BPA's competitors, many of whom are the very private
utilities that BPA had envisioned as its
regional partners when the Northwest
Power Act was passed. 91 In essence, they
see a no-lose situation. They believe they
can purchase from alternative suppliers
today and, if prices rise, assert their statutory preference right to place load on BPA
at any time. From their perspective, this is
as close to 'eating your cake and having it
too" as you can come.
6. Assumption: The Bonneville Direct
Service Industry customers would modernize their plants, and thus become a valuable net asset for BPA. Sales to the DSls
would help generate the revenues to pay
for other programs.
Fact While some DSIs modernized
their plants, many others did not. The aluminum markets collapsed in the late 1980s
and BPA adopted a 'variable" rate which
kept DSI electricity prices artificially low
when metals markets were depressed. This
maintained load that otherwise might have
been lost, and it was a prudent business
decision. The difficulty with the "Variablerate is that the ceiling was capped at a level
which was proven unreasonably low when
the DSls began to prosper in better times. 2
The DSI situation was further complicated
CLEAMNG UpiNoROM ST E.'E.EY Womxs. October 9. 1995, at 8.
91. Id.
92. See BPA 1994 Arm. RER. supra note 4, at 17.
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because they, like other BPA customers,
have sought alternative suppliers and
reduced load on BPA. 93 The power sales
contracts allow them to terminate BPA
sales on one-year' notice. To compensate,
BPA has made concessions which many
94
claim will cost BPA significant revenue.
7 Assumption: Since BPA is a self-funded agency, not subject to the vagaries of
annual appropriations, it could easily raise
enough money through its rates to fund a
wide array of conservation programs which
would otherwise not succeed because the
cost of conservation was too great absent
BPA financial support.
Fact: It is true that BPA is a self funded agency and is not dependent upon
annual appropriations. It is also true that
the Northwest Power Act treats conservation as a resource, requiring BPA to acquire
it first, and give it a 10% cost advantage.
Since passage of the Northwest Power Act,
BPA has acquired 580aMW of conservation.
This has not been easy and until recently
conservation has not paid its own way. That
is now changing.
8. Assumption: The same ability to
self-fund programs would also enable BPA
to pay for a substantial fish and wildlife
program to "protect, mitigate, and
enhance" the Columbia River's fish and
wildlife population. This would likely double the Columbia River fish runs, avoiding
Endangered Species Act listings. Both
Congressional and state legislatures would
have pressure for fish and wildlife appropriations reduced because BPA rate payers
would directly fund many of these efforts.
Fact: Since the Northwest Power Act
became law, BPA has spent more than $1.7
billion dollars on fish and wildlife. 95 Annual
93. Id.The 1994 Annual Report notes the decline in DSI sales:
Normally, sales to aluminum smelters make up well over
one-fourth of BPAs total revenues. in the past three
years, however, aluminum share of BPA total revenues
has fallen to 21.2 percent, to 18.1 percent, and to 17.8
percent in 1994. The decline is likely to continues as
competition among suppliers increased.

Id.See also Effinger, supra note 40.
94. See the "BPA Power Sales Contract" with its industrial
customers, dated August 25, 1981. especially § 2(b).
95. See BPA 1994 ANN. REP., supra note 4. at 23.
96. The primary cause of this decline is man's extraordinary
arrogance and belief that nature can be manipulated without
being destroyed. Salmon have been harvested to near extinction
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costs now equal the WPPSS annual debt
service payments. The Northwest Power
Act encouraged and the Council's program
relied on hatchery production to boost
returns. This has been highly controversial.
It has effectively been discredited by ESA
listings of Snake River fish by the National
Marine Fisheries Service, where hatcheries
have been blamed for undermining genetic
integrity of threatened and endangered
fish. Runs of fish not only have not doubled, they have in many instances dramatically declined. This decline can be attributed to an ecosystem that has been radically altered by human intervention. This
has occurred in part because of dam produced mortality, but also for other reasons,
such as habitat degradation and excessive
harvest. Warm ocean conditions producing
an "El Nifio" effect have also adversely
96
impacted the salmon's food chain.
9. Assumption: Governors of Oregon,
Washington, Idaho, and Montana would
appoint a knowledgeable body of policy
overseers to plan the electric power and fish
and wildlife future of the region in a cooperative and effective manner. They would
overlook the traditional urban-rural,
socio-economic-political divisions that
have led to the creation of what is often
called "the Cascade Curtain." The Governors
would be directly involved in this effort and
develop internally consistent policies within their own states and on a regional level.
Many of the governor's
Fact:
appointees have been people of stature.
The Council's first Chairman, former
Governor and U.S. Senator Dan Evans, was
able to gain broad political support for the
Council. There is reason to doubt however,
whether Council members' decisions are
always well coordinated with other agensince the turn of the century. See DONALDSON & CRAMER, FISHWHEELS
OF THE COLUMBIA (1971). The carrying capability of the ocean has
been severely reduced and Important aspects of the salmon's
foodchain nearly depleted. JIM LICHATOWICH, OCEAN CARRYING
CAPABILITY (1993). Salmon habitat has been degraded, and marine
mammal predation causes far greater mortality than ever envisioned. DON PARK, EFFEcTs OF MARINE MAMMALS ONiCOLUMBIA RIVER
SALMON UNDER THE ESA (1993). On top of all this, exists the
Columbia and Snake River dams. The Council' goal of doubling
salmon runs was necessarily doomed to failure, since the
Council's Program can only influence impacts caused by the
operators and regulators of the federal hydroelectric power system. 16 U.S.C. §839b(hl(ii)(A)(i) (1994). The Council has no
authority over the myriad of other critical factors contributing to
the salmon's decline, either "in river' or in the ocean.
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dies within their States. Council decisions
in the power area are far less important
with the Pacific Northwest in a surplus condition. This is because there are few
resource acquisitions being undertaken
which the Council can influence. Council
decisions concerning anadromous fish
have largely given way to the ESA process.
and the Council program has increasingly
followed rather than led regional fish and
wildlife planning as Congress intended.
The Council has also begun to break
down along traditional geo-political or
"Cascade Curtain" lines. Idaho and
Montana members are understandably
concerned about protecting their water
resources from "down river" urban interests that they sometimes see as favoring a
few "wild salmon" over agriculture and
"state's rights." They also question
whether salmon are unreasonably favored
over resident fish, such as sturgeon and
bull trout, and whether other authorized
hydroprolect purposes such as recreation
and navigation are sacrificed for the sake
of salmon. "Downriver" urban interests in
Washington and Oregon have sometimes
viewed "upriver" agriculture as subsidized,
wasteful, and provincial. These divergent
views make finding common ground very
difficult.
10. Assumption: The rock-solid financial
base produced by the above arrangements
would provide BPA a steady stream of dollars to repay its Treasury debt, pay for new
and old customer benefits, and for other
new entitlement programs the Act
required, such as fish and wildlife and conservation.
Fact. BP~s financial condition is precarious. Sales revenue has decreased significantly, lawsuits have been filed by
resource developers regarding BPA acquisition contracts, and rates cannot rise
because to do so would further erode BPA
competitiveness. BPA has used surpluses
garnered from earlier refinancing of WPPSS
debt to stay current in its Treasury payment, but outyear projections show that
without additional cost-cutting efforts
there exits a possibility of substantial
deficits.97
4. at
97.
97. See BPA i995
1995 ANr~.
AN. R~.
REP.. supra
supra note
note 4,
at 23-26.
23-26.

V. And the Answer Is?
The Northwest Power Act is broken. The
assumptions upon which it is built were as fleeting
as an east wind out of the Columbia Gorge. The
question is whether and how to fix it? In the new,
deregulated, and competitive era, do we dismantle
Bonneville. or significantly redefine its role? Is the
Bonneville Power Administration's survival important? If BPA's survival is important, are those who
benefit willing to adjust their own level of benefits
and entitlements to make this possible, or will they
continue arguing that"what is mine is mine and "we
will negotiate about yours." And will they still be
"hanging on" when they turn off the lights at BPA for
the last time? As might be expected, there is no "silver bullet." If there was. it would have been found.
Some of the more frequently discussed options,
both realistic and otherwise, include the following.
A. Administrative Options: A Partial Answer?
1. DeferTreasunj Repayment
Old solutions are unlikely to work. As BPA customers leave, and the cost of public benefits and
entitlements rise, BPA's bottom line is in jeopardy.
In earlier times, this was a prescription for a
Treasury deferral. BPA would exercise its legal right
to defer its annual repayment to the Treasury; and
continue to push its 16 billion dollar debt 9s to
future generations of ratepayers, secure in the fact
that there would be someone there to pay the bill.
Today, that is not a viable option, nor should it be.
The Pacific Northwest's loss of powerful elected officials such Senator Henry M. Jackson (D-VA) and his
protdgd Speaker of the House Tom Foley (D-\VA),
the pending retirement of Senator Mark Hatfield
(R-OR), and the momentum toward deficit reduction, makes this option highly unlikely. Senator
Hatfield's proposal to restructure the BPAs federal
debt, discussed infra, is a positive alternative for
today's changed environment.
2. Raise Rates
Similarly, raising rates in a deregulated market
already suffering from an excess of supply to
demand and depressed prices makes little sense.
This only exacerbates BPAs situation by driving
more customers to alternative suppliers, leaving
those who remain with an obligation to pay for all
of BPA's costs. Since under current law rates must
be established to recover costs, this invariably leads
to more rate increases, overly optimistic revenue
forecasts, or both.
98.

Id.

98. Id.
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The "raise the rates" scenario is a prescription
for the utility industry disease known as the "death
spiral." "Death" ensues when the fewer and fewer
remaining customers are saddled with the full magnitude of a debt that was formerly borne by many.
This leads in turn to even higher rate increases to
recover costs, which leads in turn to fewer customers who can afford to pay those higher costs.
The prognosis is terminal.
The "rely on an overly optimistic revenue forecast" strategy has equally disastrous results, and
leads over time to the same result as reality eventually catches up with fiction. By understating the
need for rate increases, and holding down rates
through reconfiguring key revenue and expense
forecasts, rate increases are effectively reduced or
postponed. The underlying problem, however, may
not be solved. As a result, later generations of
ratepayers may pay higher bills. In both cases, BPA
loses revenues and customers over time.
3. Downsize and Sell Assets
A third option is to downsize and, if necessary,
sell assets. This, it is argued, is what other businesses do under similar circumstances. To date,
BPA will cut expenses by $600 million per year from
1996-2002 and will reduce staffing levels by 1000 by
1996.99 Further cuts are likely.
Asset sales remain an option. Most frequently
discussed is the proposal that BPA sell its transmission
system,
including
the
Pacific
Northwest-Southwest Intertie and the maingrid
transmission network for the Pacific Northwest.
Selling the transmission system is an argument
made in the name of competition and deregulation.
Bonneville, it is urged, should be a leader in the
utility industry and would be viewed as such by taking this bold action. Together with others, a giant
west coast "Transco" could then be formed which
could lower costs for all users and bring about additional efficiencies by providing open access to
everyone who seeks to use it.
Not surprisingly, some of BPA's largest private
utility competitors and industries are strong supporters of this option. For these groups, BPA
remains a significant competitor, especially in the
transmission arena where it controls more than 80
percent of the maingrid and the Pacific
99. See NORTHWEST POWER PLANNING COUNCIL, sUPRA note 6.

100. See Beniamin Holden, Three FederalUtilities May Be Sold By
Year's End Under Bipartisan Plan, WALL ST. I., Sept. 11,1995, at 3
(quoting Congressman Doolittle (R-CA), Chairman of the House
Water and Power Subcommittee, as saying that he 'expects that
the federal government will have disposed of BPA and other
power marketing agencies within five years").
101. Other alternatives to assure fair access and coordination
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Northwest-Pacific Southwest Intertie. There is concern that BPA could utilize what some perceive as
market power to set rates which recover more than
actual costs. This is in contrast to the current practice where BPA rates recover only actual costs for
transmission. The thought that BPA would increase
transmission rates to raise revenue to pay for a wide
variety of costs, such as fish and wildlife, is troubling to those who must rely on BPA for wheeling
services. Such a move is also at variance with the
direction taken by the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) in its mega-NCIPR policy to
provide equal access to transmission to all users.
Companies undergoing competitive challenge,
however, rarely sell their best asset ard there is little reason for competitors to want to purchase
transmission access if it is provided consistent with
the FERC mega-NOPR's guidance. Sale of the
transmission system would be a prescription for liquidation, not reorganization. Selling BPNs transmission system makes sense only if, as some
Congressmen suggest, BPA is to be sold. 00 Absent
such a sale, for BPA to sell its transmission system
or otherwise merge it into a regional "Transco,"
would only exacerbate an already very difficult situation which is being addressed by creation of an
independent transmission business, line within
BPA.101 Sale of the transmission system would also
leave BPA with the same public benefits and entitlements but fewer means to pay for them. The BPA
resource base would consist of a relatively high cost
thermal resource, WPPSS nuclear plant number 2,
and the output of the federal hydroelectric projects,
the operations of which are increasingly driven by
fish recovery instead of power production. This
could further exacerbate the "customer flight" which
BPA is currently addressing.
One de facto liquidation option would be for
WPPSS to become competitive by reducing costs, or
close. The federal dams could be operated primarily for fish and wildlife needs, irrigation, navigation,
and recreation. The power that remains after
non-power priorities are met would be sold at auction to the highest bidder at the bus bar. Shaping
and scheduling services could be provided by someone other than BPA. BPA's continued existence is
not necessary for this alternative, lust such an
option was proposed by the Idaho Power Company
among federal and non-federal transmission owners abound. One
option would be to negotiate a "Pacific Northwest Transmission
Agreement"-a transmission plan that would parallel the already
existing "Pacific Northwest Coordination Agreement' which serves
to coordinate federal and non-federal hydroehctric operations.
Another option would be to legislatively spin-oif BPAs transmis.
sion system and create a new federal agency which would then
coordinate all transmission, both federal and non-federal.
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on December 6, 1995, in testimony before the
Subcommittee on Energy and Power House. 102
But BPA's demise would not be without significant costs. Perhaps most importantly, the concept
of BPA as the utility which can encourage competition through a "yardstick!' rate to keep other electric
suppliers' prices as low as possible consistent with
sound business principles would be lost. In the end,
with the removal of the largest utility from the landscape, and the resultant loss of competition, the
end use consumer would lose. The social benefits
BPA provides through funding for fish and wildlife
and conservation would also disappear. If
Bonneville does not fund these public benefits,
Congress or the states would need to appropriate
the billions of dollars of funds for these activities.
That is not likely to happen. Nor would BPAs fixed
debt to the Treasury disappear. Because BPAs liabilities far exceed its assets, some significant portion of the $16 billion Treasury debt would likely be
required to be absorbed by the U.S. taxpayer. No
rational purchaser would pay such a price for an
asset, nor is there reason to believe that the
Administration would accept a reduced price.
4. Assert Contractand Other Rights
Environmental groups and some public utilities argue that BPA should assert its contract rights
and, wherever possible, insist that its customers
continue to purchase large blocks of power from
BPA. Two measures are suggested: reductions in
residential exchange payments made to large, primarily investor owned utilities, and the imposition
of "stranded investment" costs to require those customers that do leave to pay for their fair share of
BPA's sunk costs associated with nuclear projects,
fish and wildlife, and other programs. These sunk
costs have been undertaken in reliance on those
customers continuing to buy power from BPA. Both
issues are spawning significant political debate and
legislative action. In the end, they may be resolved
by the courts.
The residential exchange was captured in section 7(b) of the Northwest Power Act. It assured,
through a complex methodology, that residential
and farm consumers would pay rates roughly equiv-
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alent to those paid by comparable public utility
consumers.103 It was intended to create rate parity
between residential customers of public and private
utilities. The Act requires BPA to enter into agreements with exchanging utilities to exchange their
higher priced power for BPA's lower cost power, with
BPA paying the difference. The protection for public
utilities was that their customers would never be
worse off than they would have been in the absence
of the exchange arrangement.
However, as previously discussed, the assumptions of the Northwest Power Act have proven largely erroneous. One such assumption was that BPA
customers would continue to enjoy low-cost power.
In fact, BPA costs have risen and exchanging utility
costs have declined. As a result, BPA proposed to
reduce the exchange subsidy from $200 million per
year to $75 million. 0 4 The reason: rate parity can now
exist in the absence of a subsidy, or with a substantially reduced subsidy. The issue is currently pending
in BPAs rate case, where it will be driven by recent
congressional action fixing the level of the exchange
benefits at S 145 million for Fiscal Year 1997.105A similar "cost-recovery" issue is raised through the
"stranded investment" debate precipitated at the
national level by the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission's outstanding Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (NOPR).1'6 The question is whether a
utility which loses customers to alternative suppliers
can charge those customers exit fees or a similar
charge to recoup costs incurred for resources that
were acquired to serve those customers in the long
term. Here, many utility customers and industries
find common ground. They all want the right to leave
without paying for costs which BPA has incurred in
the expectation of continuing to serve them. BP's
nuclear plant costs are the most frequently discussed, although fish and wildlife costs are also at
stake. Environmentalists, on the other hand, and
some of BP~s public utility customers, see BPA giving up a valuable right. BPA has recently signed contracts with certain aluminum companies which
arguably relieve them of the obligation to pay
'stranded investment costs." The contracts assume
that if enough load remains with BPA. recovery of
such costs will be unnecessary. Those contracts are

102. A vanant of this option was recently suggested by Mr.
Brett Wilcox. the owner of Northwest Aluminum Company.
Thoughts on Restructunng the Northwest Electnc Power Industry
(a paper presented to the Governors Review Committee on
February 14. 1996).

104. See Ba:iu.LE Powm, Ao:.smo:n. DOE/BP-2607,
1996 IM LRATE PgonsAL (1995).

103. See H.R. REP. No. 976. supra note 26, at 34. As noted earlier. residential exchange subsidiary costs to date have totaled
$2,445.224. Conversations with BPA Residential Exchange Staff,
Portland. Oregon. This includes $194,352,693 for fiscal year 1995.
and by statute, $145 million for fiscal year 1990. See Infra note 113.

106. See Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. Recovery
of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities.
Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. 70 FERC 61.357
(March 29. 1995) (the Commission's mega-NOPR). See also
NoRTwEST Po-mm PLtca n. Couu .csupra note 6. at 16-17.

105. SeeAct of lanuary 4. 1995. Pub. L No. 104-46. Title V.
508(e) (1995). See also Nomiiwm Powi Pt.;G
CcUmal, supra
note 6. at 13-15 (discussing the residential exchange issue).
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highly controversial. Not surprisingly, other BPA customers are now seeking similar protections. 107
B. Legislative Change
While it lasted, the Northwest Power Act was a
movable feast. The parties who signed onto this
complex, highly technical statute got the benefit of
their bargain. For sixteen years, they have enloyed a
wonderful land of never ending benefits and entitlements. Their mistake was in assuming that the party
could go on forever.
Deregulation, the California recession, the collapse of the electricity commodity market caused by
plunging natural gas prices, and a new found political antipathy to deficit spending has brought the
Bonneville Power Administration, and those who
benefitted from its existence face to face with reality. The sixteen-year party is over.
This brings us to the present. BP~s utility customers, states, Indian tribes, other federal agencies
and those who benefit from BPAs continued existence must look themselves in the mirror. BPA is
struggling financially, seeking to adjust to a new,
competitive environment while recognizing that it
must act more like a business than a government
agency. To survive, fundamental legislative change is
essential. The change will not be easy, however.
BPA's competitors would frequently prefer that it go
out of business, while many of its remaining customers are increasingly indifferent as they survey the
options presented by a deregulated utility industry.
The need for change is the sublect of an intense
ongoing "regional review" in 1996. The Department of
Energy and the Bonneville Power Administration
called for such a review on September 28, 1995. They
urged that its scope be broad and include a
"re-examination of the ...Northwest Power Act of
1980" and all other "organic BPA statutes, including
the Bonneville Prolect Act of 1937, the Flood Control
Act of 1944, the ...
Regional Preference Act ...and
107. See Idaho Rivers United v. Bonneville PowerAdministration,
No. 95-70340 (9th Cir., April 25, 1995) (case dismissed), supra note 86.
108. DOE Press Release, supra note 9, at 1-2.
109. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 293, supra note 76.
I10. See id. at 93. The conferees "urge a renewed review ...
within the authorizing committees in the next session of
Congress to answer these important issues, Ifish and wildlife
costs and their controll, and other important issues confronting
the region." Id.at 94. It is likely that this review will not be completed until after the 1996 elections.
I 11. See Governors' Letter of December 14, 1995.
112. The politics of "sufficiency" language proved impossible because of the significant criticism that the Clinton
Administration encountered when it agreed to very broad sufficiency language in the timber salvage law.
113. See the report of the Committee on Conference making
Appropriations for Energy and Water Development for Fiscal Year
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the ...Transmission System Act." 103 The "regional
review" is also endorsed by the Conference Report of
the Appropriations Committee for Energy and Water
Development for Fiscal Year 1996.i °0 The Report
notes that "there is a nearly unanimous call from
affected parties-user groups and ratepayers-.. to
start the review of the Northwest Power Act."iio The
Pacific Northwest governors kicked off the review on
January 4, 1996, with a commitment to "have an adequate, efficient, economical, and reliable power system despite the restructuring of the incustry."iII
I. Intenin Solutions
On an interim basis, some statutory changes
have already been made, and others are forthcoming. They include an attempt to address fish and
wildlife funding, regional preference, the residential
exchange, and debt refinancing,
a. The Saga of the Energy and Water
Appropriations Act for 1996
The first significant steps to recovering BPA's
financial health were taken in the Energy and Water
Development Appropriations Act for 1996. Initially
seen as a legislative vehicle to provide stable, long
term funding for fish and wildlife, the bill ran into
heavy sledding when Senator Hatfield sought "sufficiency" language to assure by statute that the more
than 4 billion dollars BPA proposed to spend would
12
satisfy its environmental responsibilities.1
The legislation that emerged, which was enacted
without fiscal year limitation, would cause a reasonable person to ask, "where's the beef?" or, in this case,
"where's the fish?" While the legislation significantly
amends regional preference, fixes the level of residential exchange benefits for fiscal year 1997, provides procurement and personnel flexibility, and
obliquely addresses the need for greater regional control of fish and wildlife issues, fish financing and ehvironmental sufficiency are not statutorily addressed.i 13
1996. H.R. CONF.REP. No. 293, supra note 76, at 10-11, 74, 93-95,
The legislation, sponsored by Senator Hatfield and adopted without respect to fiscal year limitation, is a one pert of a two-part
arrangement to help assure fish and wildlife funding and allow
BPA greater marketing flexibility.
H.R. 1905, the Energy and Water Development Appropriations
Act for 1996, is the first of what will likely be several bills introduced
to address BPA issues. Itaddresses but does not conclusively dispose of three subsidies. residential exchange baneflts, fish and
wildlife costs, and regional preference. Fish and wildlife costs were
constrained through an administrative agreement, and residential
exchange benefits were set at $145 million for fiscal year 1997, substantially above what had been anticipated in the initial BPA rate
proposal. Regional preference amendments were added to allow
greater marketing flexibility. The importance of H.R. 1905, however,
lies in the fact that it signals Congress's willlingnes., to engage these
difficult issues. As noted in conference. "[tlhe conferees...urge a
renewed review of the Northwest Power Act to answer these and
other important issues confronting the region." Id.at 93.
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Section 508(3) of the law allows BPA to sell
what is defined as "excess power" on a firm basis for
seven years without respect to the recall provisions
of the Northwest Power Act, or the resale provisions
of the Bonneville Project Act. "Excess power" is that
class of power which is created by customers leaving BPA for other suppliers and by operations of the
federal Columbia River power system undertaken
primarily for the benefit of fish and wildlife. BPA is
to prepare a report for Congress concerning how it
will implement "the sale of excess federal power"
4
provisions within 90 days."
Section 508(e) addresses residential exchange
issues. It calls for a $145 million payment to exchanging utilities for fiscal year 1997, together with report
that "to the extent
language directing
practicable... such actions as are necessary to assure
that the proposed rate for public utilities and direct
service industnes are not increased from the initial
proposal."" 5 This guidance would seem particularly
difficult to achieve without increasing the risk of a
Treasury shortfall because there are no other "pockets" from which to collect revenues. BPs challenge
will be to meet this directive and also adhere to the
admonition of the Conference Committee which
stated that "[rlecent actions by [BPAI have led to
concerns that IBPA] may not make its Treasury payment in fiscal year 1996" and added that "failure by
IBPAI to make the full annual payment to Treasury
will seriously jeopardize its credibility with Congress
6
and will lead to more involvement by Congress."'i
While assuring Treasury payment is a laudable
and correct goal, it is not one that is furthered by
directing BPA to increase the size of the residential
exchange while also limiting its ability to collect the
shortfall from others. Regrettably, in a deregulated
environment, the banker or, in BPAs case the
Treasury, can expect shortfalls. The question is not
whether such shortfalls will occur, but how to make
the Treasury "whole" in the event that the competitive market environment leads to this unfortunate
circumstance.
Section 508(c), while procedural in nature, is
important because it signals Congress' increasing
frustration with federal fish and wildlife agencies
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involvement in what many view as a Northwest
resources issue. The Power Council is directed
"within 180 days ... to report to Congress regarding
the most appropriate governance structure to allow
more effective regional control over efforts to conserve and enhance anadromous and resident fish
and wildlife" within the Columbia River system.
The conferees were also concerned that
increasing BPA fish and wildlife costs not result in a
"shifting of costs-both directly and indirectly-to the
nation's taxpayers and to non-federal interests on
the Columbia and Snake River system" including
"the region's electric ratepayers, agriculture.
non-federal hydroelectric project owners, river
users, reservoir users, water interests, and others."ii 7 This presents interesting questions of fairness. Funding for the Endangered Species Act activities of most federal agencies is appropriated, and
therefore spread across all of the nation's taxpayers.
If normal rules applied, therefore, approximately
$200 million per year of BPA's fish and wildlife costs
would be paid for by the "nation's taxpayers."
However, because BPA uses the Bonneville Fund to
pay fish and wildlife costs, normal rules do not
apply, and BPA rate-payers pay the entire bill.1is
Finally, section 508(d) gives the Corps of
Engineers procurement flexibility by enabling it to
use BP~s authorities for FCRPS power generation
and fish and wildlife operations, and BPA is authorized by section 508(f) to offer separation incentives
of up to $25,000 to further reduce employment.
The fish and wildlife funding issues that were
intended to be addressed in the Energy and Water
Appropriations bill are instead addressed separately
in an Administration agreement with Congress. The
agreement, memorialized in an October 29, 1995 letter from Budget Director Alice Rivlin to Senate
Appropriations Committee Chairman Mark Hatfield
approved a ten-year funding level of $252 million for
the ESA biological opinions and the Council Fish
and Wildlife Program, plus whatever costs are associated with needed hydro-power operations. It also
created a "Fish Cost Contingency Fund" from which
BPA can draw section 4h10(C) credits already owed
its ratepayers to help assure Treasury repayment." 9

114. id. at 95.

fund). The letter references and builds upon Director Riviin's

115. Id.

March 15. 1995 testimony before the Subcommittee on Energy
and Water of the Senate Appropriations Committee. The

116. Id.at 74.
117. Id. at 93.

118. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 838i(b)(12), 839b(h)(10)(A), (B) (1994).
This anomaly is left to a later Congress to address.
119. Letter from Alice Rivlin, Director, Department of
Office and Management, to Senator Mark Hatfield (R-O ,
Chairman, Committee on Appropriations, United States
Congress (Oct. 24, 1995) (establishing the 'fish contingency,

approximately $325 million in the "fish contingency fund"
comes from BPA ratepayers who have overpaid their fish and
wildlife bill for the past 15 years because of a statutory obligation to pay from the Bonneville fund for all fish and wildlife
costs'on a system wide basis." Such payments are, infact. more
than Is owed by BPA because BPA Is only to pay for the
hydropower share of the projects. which averages about 73% of
total project costs. The other 21%is the responsibility of other
project purposes, and not ratepayers. The law contemplated a
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b. Debt Refinancing
Senate Bill 92, the Bonneville Power
Administration Appropriations Refinancing Act, has
become law. It is part of the Omnibus Fiscal Year
1996 Appropriations Act signed by President
Clinton on April 25, 1996. It was co-sponsored by
Senators Mark Hatfield (R-OR) and Patty Murray
(D-WA) and had Administration support. 12 The law
restructures BPA's outstanding Treasury debt. This
is accomplished by resetting the outstanding principal at the present value of the principal and annual interest that BPA would pay in the absence of the
Act, plus $100 million.
BPA's debt and the relatively low interest rates
that are charged for projects such as the
Bonneville dam are constantly criticized as government subsidies for ratepayers who already enjoy
some of the lowest utility rates in the nation. The
new law is designed to end that debate and criticism. The BPA and its customers will get certainty
from this law, which precludes any administrative
refixing of BPAs low interest debt at current market rates. The federal taxpayers are paid a bonus of
$100 million for giving up any arguable right to
undertake such an administrative refixing. The new
interest rates are based on the Treasury
Department's prevailing yield curve, with future
capital investments based on Treasury market
rates at the time when the investments are placed
in service. Expected benefits in reduced net federal outlays are $45 million over the period fiscal
year 1996 through fiscal year 1998.121
2. Longer Term: Statutory Change that Pulls the
Straws Out of the Punchbowl
While the interim steps taken by the Energy
and Water Appropriations Act and the debt refinance law are positive for the near term, a longer
term solution is needed if BPA is to survive. That
solution must address the fact that BPA is saddled
"true up" at Treasury which in fact never occurred. The
Rivlin-Hatfield agreement is important because the
Administration acknowledges the debt and establishes a specific fund and a means by which BPA ratepayers can reclaim what
is rightly owed to them. See Memorandum from Harvard P.
Spigal. General Counsel, Bonneville Power Administration, to
Randall Hardy. Administrator and Chief Executive Officer,
Department of Energy, interpreting § 4(h)(10)(c) of the
Northwest Power Act (June 6. 1994).
120. Senators Mark Hatfield (R-OR) and Patty Murray
(D-WA) introduced the bill on January 4, 1995. See 141 CONG. REc.
S50 (daily ed. Jan. 4, 1995).
121. See Heanngs on S. 92 Before the Subcomm. on Energy
Production and Regulation of the Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural
Resources, 104th Cong., Ist Sess. 3 (1995) (statement of lack
Robertson,
Deputy Administrator
Bonneville
Power
Administration).
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with the Northwest Power Act that assumed a utility world that is now surely as e~tinct as the
dinosaur.
Finding a solution, and then gathering the
political will to adopt it into law, will be a
Herculean task. Some of BPAs customers are now
its competitors, and those who remain are
increasingly unwilling to expend the political capital to help BPA survive when there is a cheaper
supplier readily available. Environmental activists
and Indian Tribes should support a 13PA solution
that works. Conservation, fish and wildlife, and
other socially desirable projects paid for by BPA
ratepayers are unlikely to be funded at anywhere
near current levels by state legislatures or
Congress. But they do not approve of BPA either:
they argue that BPA should "hold onto its current
customers," terminate the remaining WPPSS
nuclear plant, and increase their share of the
financial pie. What many seem incapable of realizing or accepting is that the pie could disap122
pear.
The punch bowl metaphor is one that is frequently used by BPAs customers and public interest groups. Those who benefit from the public benefits and entitlements hold the straws and do the
sucking. BPA is the keeper of the punch bowl and
the punch. The problem is simple: too many straws
and not enough punch. The issue is fundamental
to BPA's long term survival and can only be corrected by significant change to BPA's organic
statutes.
Legislation is the art of the possible. However,
it is unrealistic to expect we can pay for socially
desirable programs such as fish and wildlife and
conservation, and maintain relatively low power
rates and quality transmission facilities, unless
there is a political recognition of the need to agree
to a "benefits giveback" program. All who benefit
must sacrifice something if Bonneville is to remain
122. Environmental groups are understandably torn, They
face a statutory game of "fish funding jeopardy." Behind "door
number one" is something of tremendous value: BPA's self-funded status. It is valuable because it avoids testing Columbia River
fish and wildlife needs against other priorities; a balancing that
normally occurs through the appropriations process, These same
needs may exceed BPKs ability to pay. And BPAs financial condition is precarious. This leads to "door number two" the risk of
failure to "lock in" now on some certain level of funding, may
mean there is even less funding in the future If BPA's customers
continue to seek other suppliers. Maybe everyone Is better off
with something relatively certain than somethlrg so uncertain.
Certainty regarding BP~s financial future on what some view as
discretionary fish and wildlife funding Is critical IfBPA Is to retain
existing customers and find new ones. And If ex;ting customers
leave, or new ones fail to materialize, both BPA and the fish and
wildlife interests are harmed.
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viable. 23 The alternative, particularly if the
Republican party retains congressional control and
wins the Presidency in 1996, may be BPAs sale or
dismantlement. 24While the latter may be lauded or
lamented as a matter of policy, it will bring about
fundamental change in a Pacific Northwest economy which has planned and operated its electric system as ifthere were but "one utility" with BPA as the
largest of the lot.
What follows are suggestions as to how BPA
could be reshaped. The key is not any one proposal
but a statutory framework that allows the flexibility
to adjust to changing times, and correct perceived
excesses through the political process. We are arrogant and presumptuous if we believe we are sufficiently visionary to write a new law that will correctly predict the future. Events can and will change,
and the "statutory contract" model of the Northwest
Power Act should be discarded. The "regional review
process" on which the Pacific Northwest is embarking will be painful enough without the need to "do
it all over again" in ten years.

This was a battle that was to occupy "Scoop"
Jackson throughout his entire forty-three-year
career. As Chairman of the Senate Energy
Committee, he was the primary sponsor of the
Federal Columbia River TransmissiQn System Act of
1974127 (FCRTSA). The FCRTSA created the
Bonneville Fund as a separate fund within the
Treasury from which expenditures could be made
without further appropriation by Congress. It also
provided for submission of a budget under the
Government Corporation Act. In 1985, the
Bonneville Fund was exempted from sequestration
under the Graham-Rudman Act.23
Since his death, Senator Jackson's long-time
overseer role of the BPA has been assumed by his
friend and colleague, Senator Mark Hatfield
(R-OR). Recognizing that additional change was
needed, Senator Hatfield and Congressman Peter
DeFazio (D-OR) supported a June 1993 contract
with the National Academy of Public
Administration (NAPA). The purpose of the contract was to examine measures that would
increase BPA's efficiency and effectiveness without
a. Government Corporation
changing its substantive statutory obligations.
Government Corporation legislation is not a
NAPAs report recommended Government
solution in itself; it is a framework for a solution.
Corporation status for Bonneville. it noted that
BPA's ability to function as a business has been
BPA possesses attributes that are common to
hampered since its inception by the rules, regulaother primarily business entities like the U.S. Post
tions, and procedures that bureaucracy imposes on
Office: business oriented; self-sustaining; and
more traditional regulatory agencies. A series of
involving substantial business transactions with
legislative changes have sought to correct this situthe public.
ation, with only partial success.
While yet to be introduced in Congress, a
draft proposal for comprehensive government corThe first and only amendment to the
Bonneville Project Act was offered expressly for
poration legislation has been reviewed within the
the purpose of freeing the Administrator from
region,
and is circulating within the
Administration. Several information hearings
these sorts of requirements. 125 Then Congressman
Henry "Scoop" Jackson (D-WA) observed that
have been held, the most recent in June 1995
"[tihe Bonneville Power Administration is not carbefore the Subcommittee on Government
rying out a governmental regulatory program. It is
Management, Information, and Technology before
engaged in a large-scale business enterprise, ... the House Committee on Government Reform and
Oversight. The legislation, as envisioned by BPAs
the third largest distributor of power in the United
6
Deputy Administrator lack Robertson, would creStates." 2
123. Sacrifice is not a word which comes easily to the beneficianes of BPAs largess, and the task Is made far more complicated because of deregulation. Utilities and Industnes now have
the ability to "play the market." They can purchase power from
suppliers other than BPA, and then ask BPA to wheel It to them
at cost. 16 U.S.C. § 838(g). (h) (1994). By such practice they hope
to avoid the type of stranded costs discussed in the FERC
mega-NOPR. See 70 FERC 61.357, supra note 106. Needless to say,
they are reluctant to willingly give up such a benefit.
The "deregulation issue" spills over Into the world of politics. In the case of the timber industry. many Northwest logging
companies have no alternative supplier to Forest Service lands
and therefore fight tenaciously for a solution that lets them stay
in business. BPA customers, especally preference customers,
fight far less tenaciously. They can and are purchasing power

elsewhere. As a consequence, they appear at times far less interested In finding a solution to BPAs difficulties than they did in

1980 when BPA was, with few exceptions. their solesupplier
124. See Holden. supra note 100. at 3.
125. Act of October 23. 59 Stat. 546 ch. 433. § I (as amend-

ed by16 U.S.C. § 832a() (1994}).
126. Harfngs on H.R. 2690 and H.R. 2693 Bfore the House
'tRivrand Harfors, 79th Cong.. ist Sess. (June 20.

Contnfte on

1945).
127. 16 US.C. § 838{a)-(k) (1994).
128. Set Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act
(Graham-Rudman), § 905(g)1) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §8381k)
(1994)).
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ate BPA as a government corporation under the
.Government Corporation Act. Potential savings
would reach $30 million per year.129 The savings
would come from personnel, procurement, and
other procedures which hamper the decisionmaking required by a competitive utility. For example,
while the Transmission System Act allows BPA to
directly fund its programs, and sell revenue bonds
to the Treasury to finance capital investments,
BPA is still subject to General Accounting Office
rules that apply to. appropriated agencies. 3 0
Similarly, Bonneville is restrained by civil service
rules. It is prohibited, by way of illustration, from
hiring temporary employees when needed, or
from directly hiring other critical skill positions for
operation of a ufility. Similar red tape exists in the
realty and procurement arena. Little is done
quickly and what is done frequently costs BPA
more than its competitors would pay for comparable service.
For a government corporation to succeed, it is
prudent to place upon its board of directors a cadre
of knowledgeable business executives, representatives of public interest groups, and state representatives. Other institutions, absent needed statutory
reform, could be sunseted as their function of state
guidance over BPA activities would be efficiently
served through a significant presence on a BPA
board of directors.
b. Rates Issues
i. "Market Based Rates" for the Sale of Power
For BPA to be competitive in a deregulated
utility world, it is critical that it be allowed broad
flexibility to charge "market based rates." The
directive to set rates "as low as possible consistent
with sound business principles" is fine as far as it
goes, and works well over the long term. The rub
lies in demonstrating that those rates assure that
during the relatively short term rate period BPA
will recover all of its costs. The fact is that in a
highly volatile, deregulated and competitive environment there are times when that simply will not
happen.
Statutory change should be made to allow
power rates to fully reflect market conditions. The
Treasury should share in the profits. A more normal
banker-business relationshijo should replace the
political posturing that too frequently surrounds
the Treasury repayment issue.
129. See Heanng on S. 92 Before the Subcomm. on Energy Productionand
Regulation of ihe Senate Comm. on Energy and NaturalResources, 104th Cong.,
Ist Sess. 7 (1995) (statement of lack Roberson, Deputy Administrator,
Bonneville Power Administration).
130. Id.at 8-9.
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ii. Rate Benefits: Residential Exchange, Irrigation
and More
Bonneville also financially supports what were
once thought to be "higher cost utilities" through the
residential exchange. The need for the exchange, as
discussed above, is one of the key erroneous
assumptions of the Northwest Power Act, While the
residential exchange is fixed at $145 million for fiscal
year 1997, it is in fact time for it to end. If competition is the new order of the day, such benefits are no
more supportable than the outdated preference and
priority right of public power. Likewise, the irrigation
benefits that BPA pays directly through the obligation to provide the Bureau of Reclamation with
low-cost power for huge pumping operations at
Banks Lake near Grand Coulee Dam should be
repealed. Finally, let us not forget two other impediments to a truly level playing field: the low density
discount rate provisions that are established to benefit rural area power service, and the "indigenous raw
matenils" provision included by Congressman
Weaver to help the Hanna Nickel Company. 131
iii. Rate Procedures
As earlier noted, the Northwest Power Act
requires BPA to engage in complicated, lengthy, and
adversarial rate procedures. The rationale for these
rate procedures has ceased to exist. BPA is no longer
the single wholesale supplier of electricity and electricity, in a deregulated era, has become a commodity. As noted by former BPA Administrator Charles
Luce: "Ifelectricity is to be available to all from many
sources at 'market prices' there should be little need
for elaborate and lengthy rate proceedings to protect
utility and industrial customers. Competition, 'the
13 2
invisible hand,' should do most of the regulating."
Alternatively, even if the rate procedures are left
in place, there will be far less interest in BPA rate
cases if the benefits and entitlements that are built
into BPA's statutes are significantly reduced or eliminated. Quite simply, there will not be as much left
about which to fight. In the interim, the
multi-month BPA 1996 rate case continues.
Attorneys and experts for BPA, its customers, and
public interest groups continue to support or challenge the rates, as their financial interests are best
served, while keeping one eye fixed on the ongoing
"Regional Review" and other initiatives such as that
begun by Senator Slade Gorton (R-WA) to reexamine BP~s underlying statutes and authorities.
131. 16 U.S.C. § 839e(d)(I)(2) (1994),
132. Speech by former BPA Administrator Charles Luce,
December 7, 1995, "Re-examining BPA's Policies In a Competitive
Environment."
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c. Preference Provisions
Longstanding preference provisions are ripe for
a "give back," having long ago served their purpose
of enabling public utilities and cooperatives to get
into the utility business. There are several preference provisions that obligate Bonneville to give priority to certain classes of customers: public preference for all publicly owned utilities and cooperatives, 133 regional preference for all Pacific Northwest
electricity users. 34 Montana preference for
Montanans from the Hungry Horse dam in their
state , 3 5 and low density discount rate benefits for
sparsely populated areas.13 6 The arguments for
modification, if not outright repeal, are eminently
reasonable although politically charged.
Preference was included in the original
Bonneville Proiect Act and subsequent laws on the
assumption that public agencies needed a government priority to get into business, and that the
Pacific Northwest needed protection from
California utilities. They worked. Now, in many
cases, the public agencies are every bit as large and
powerful as their private counterparts, and the
deregulation of the electric industry has brought
about a west coast energy market which knows no
artificial geographic preference.
There is an additional complicating factor
emerging from the new paradigm of competitiveness. Many of BP~s existing customers are selecting private utilities or energy brokers as their preferred providers instead of BPA. They should be free
to do so. While this may be a rational economic policy choice for those utilities, it cuts the ground from
under any credible argument that preference still
has real meaning.
Regrettably, however, the law as now written
arguably provides those same public utilities who
would abandon BPA, the right to later call on BPA to
provide preference service at BPA's lowest rate if the
economics of a BPA purchase again become attractive, and if BPA has not otherwise sold all of its
remaining power on a long-term, non-recallable
basis to others. This is fundamentally unfair to BPA
and its remaining customers. It stands on its head
the implied covenant between BPA and the public
utility community: that BPA will provide power services and that public power will rely on BPA as their
provider of choice. Bonneville and those who continue to rely on it, including those outside the
133. Northwest Power Act. 16 U.S.C. § 839c(a). g(c) (1994)
(affirming the preference and priority provisions of the Bonneville
Proiect Act. 16 U.S.C. § 832a(f) (1994)).
134. Pacific Northwest Preference Act. 16 U.S.C. § 837h
(1994); Northwest Power Act. 16 U.S.C. § 839f(c) (1994).
135. 16 U.S.C. § 839g(f) (1994).
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Pacific Northwest, should have the discretion but
not the obligation to serve customers who elect to
rely on the free market. Preference laws that would
require BPA to take such northwest customers back
should be changed to provide public bodies a right
of first refusal to purchase BPA power which, if not
exerased, would be lost. Failure to make comparable changes in regional preference will also limit
BPA's ability to sign long term power sales and
exchange agreements with California and other
southwest customers. These agreements, if they can
be struck, can be good for BPAs bottomline qnd
good for the environment. Such sales frequently
displace more expensive thermal generation which
causes air quality problems.
d. New Large Single Loads
Ifcompetition is the new order of the day, the
.new large single load provisions" (NLSL) of the
Northwest Power Act should also be repealed. 37
The provisions define "new large single load" as
"any load associated with a new facility, an existing
facility, or an expansion of an existing facility" that
is not "contracted for or committed to" a public or
private utility or federal agency by September I.
1979 and "which will result in an increase in power
requirements of ten average megawatts or more in
any consecutive twelve-month period." 38
Legal careers have been made and logic sorely
tested in interpreting this inherently anti-competitive "new large single load provision.' Any load considered a new large single load is denied access to
the low-cost federal base system resources which are
provided to public agencies and their loads which
were already served when the Act became law. 39
Such loads are served with BPA power at rates based
on BP,'s other, usually more expensive, resources.
These 'new large single load" provisions represent the worst in a coalition of public and private
utility interests. Their purpose is to (1) hinder the
formation of new public utilities, (2) deter existing
industry that uses more than 10 average megawatts
from leaving its current service area, and (3) discourage large new industry from moving to the
Northwest. The assumptions that underlie its enactment have proven wrong. They included, first, that
since all utilities would buy power from BPA. they
would be applied equally. In fact, since private utilities and large public generators have boughtvery lit136.16 U.S.C § 839e(d](I) (1994).
137. 16 US.C. §§ 839a(13). e(fj (1994): H.R. REp. No. 976.
supra note 26. at 51-53.
138. 16 US.C. § 839a(1311A). (B) (1994).
139. 16 U.S.C. § 839(e)(f) (1994).
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tie power from BPA, or can readily find alternative
supplies, the "NLSL" provisions have disproportionately disadvantaged smaller utilities that take all of
their power from BPA in their ability to site new
industry. This has, on occasion, given rise to creative
opinions regarding whether a load was in fact "contracted for or committed to" and equally creative
interpretations regarding the assumption that extra
regional industry would flock to the Northwest to
purchase power. The assumption regarding cheap
BPA power, moreover, has also proven erroneous.
Finally, the provisions have tended to restrain trade.
Industry which is doing business in one utility service area can be reluctant to move to a new provider
for fear that it will be treated as a "new large single
load" and required to pay BPAs highest rate.
e. Northwest Power Planning Council
Opinions vary on the continued usefulness of
the Northwest Power Planning Council. As envisioned, it was a useful body. It is certainly the most
ambitious of several congressional undertakings to
better coordinate common issues shared by states
which border the Columbia River system. 4 0
While the Council has been successful in serving
as a forum for the central planning of a fish and
wildlife program and power plan, the geo-political
divisions between upriver and downriver states, the
increasingly politicized nature of its decisionmaking,
and the key changes in the assumptions which lay
behind its creation, have greatly reduced its effective41
ness in the absence of significant statutory reform.
To understand the need for change, the reason for the
Council's existence must be understood.
The Council was created for two reasons: to
prepare a Fish and Wildlife Program and a Power
and Conservation Plan. Both would give the states
the key planning role they desired as regards BPAs
operations. The assumptions that underlie the need
for both, however, have significantly changed.
140. The Northwest Power Planning Council is only the latest of several attempts to better coordinate issues between States
that share the Columbia River system. The first and only such
compact to be implemented is the Washington-Oregon Fisheries
Compact of 1918. See Act of April 8, 918, Pub. L. No. 123 (consenting to "Oregon and Washington...regulating, protecting, and
preserving fish in the boundary waters of the Columbia River").
RCW 75.60 and ORS 507.010. The compact is used today to regulate i-river harvest under the United States v. Oregon, 666 E
Supp. 1461 (D. Or. i987) allocating harvest among Treaty Tribes of
the Columbia and the States. While not members, the Tribes participate In and abide by the decisions of the compact, Idaho and
Idaho Tribes have tried unsuccessfully to ioin the compact.
Other pre-Power Planning Council efforts include the
Columbia River Compact of 1925. It authorized Washington,
Oregon, Montana, and Idaho to negotiate for "an equitable allocation and appropriation of .. the water supply of the Columbia
River and the streams tributary thereto." See Pub. L. 609-68
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With respect to fish and wildlife, especially
anadromous fish, the Power Act assumed that with
enough BPA funding and a coordinated plan, there
would be significant increases in the total number of
returning adult salmon to the Columbia River. Thus,
there emerged the Council's goal of "doubling the
fish runs" by building new hatcheries. The hatcheries, however, are still largely on the drawing
boards and reliance on this approac-i to fisheries
enhancement has to a significant extent been politically and biologically discredited by Endangered
Species Act initiatives which seek to protect wild
fish whose genetic integrity is. said to be compromised by the introduction of large numbers of
hatchery stock. The Council's Program also could
not adequately address or account for changing
ocean conditions, marine mammal prcdation, limited habitat, and continued excessive harvest. Harvest
is a particularly difficult question, which is made
more difficult by the National Marine Fisheries
Service's conflicting goals of supporting harvest, on
the one hand, while saving endangered species, on
the other. The listed species are harvested in a
mixed stock fishery which presently does not require
the distinguishing of hatchery fish from ESA stocks.
The Council's jurisdiction on fish and wildlife is
also limited to the Columbia River. It does not
extend into the ocean where harvest disputes
between the United States and Canada regarding
implementation of the Pacific Salmon Treaty tend
to exacerbate an already difficult situation. And the
Council's Program, when applicable, "guides" only
the hydropower operators and regulators:
Bonneville, the Corps of Engineers, the Bureau of
Reclamation, and the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission. Other key agencies responsible for an
managing fishery issues, including lhe National
Marine Fisheries Service, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service, the Forest Service, the Bureau of Land
Management, and the Environmental Protection
(March 4, 1925). Two Presidential appointees were to be participate in the multi-state negotiations, The compact recognized
that issues including "irrigation, power, domestic, and navigation
uses" would be addressed, although it was silent on fish and
wildlife resources. Id.The authorization to enter l.,to the compact
was extended to 1927 and then lapsed,
Finally, the Pacific Northwest River's Commission Is worth
noting. It was initiated when the compact to authorize and allocate Columbia River waters among Washington, Oregon, Idaho,
Montana, and Wyoming died. See Act of July 16, 1952, Pub. L, No,
572-82 (1952). The Commission was to study water Issues, The
Commission has been terminated. Exec. Order No. 12319, 46
C.F.R. 45,591 (1981).
141. The Council's Power Plan has become less relevant as
customers leave BPA and the Pacific Northwest generally has a
power surplus. The Fish and Wildlife Program Ias been superseded to a large degree by the federal governmert's initiatives In
the Endangered Species Act.
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Agency, are not obligated to "act consistently with
the Program" and do not do always do so. This
effectively precludes an ecosystem-system
approach to resource management that looks at all
four "Hs" comprehensively: hatcheries, habitat,
hydro, and harvest. The bottom line is that nearly
two billion dollars have been spent and the trend
line for fish and wildlife-enhancement is only mar142
ginally improved.
The Council is now embarked on a "180 day
review" process to address these issues, as-required
by section 508(c) of House Bill 1905, the Energy and
Water Development Appropriations Act for 1996.
Congress clearly wants "more effective regional control over efforts to conserve and enhance anadromous and resident fish and wildlife" within the
Columbia River. Council relevancy in the fish and
wildlife area will be determined by the results of
this review, and the action, if any. that is taken
143
regarding its recommendations.
The assumptions that underlie the need for a
comprehensive Power Plan have also been seriously eroded. The Power Plan presupposed a regulated
electric utility environment where BPA supplied
most Northwest utilities with all or a large share of
their power needs. As previously noted, that
assumption is no longer valid. It also assumed a
need for an activist initiative to encourage consumers to conserve electricity. BPA prices were
believed to be too low to encourage consumers to
do otherwise, and they would not do so left to their
own devices. That assumption has likewise proven
incorrect over time. The market place and increasing BPA rates now send the proper signal for conservation, and there is no longer any need for a
statutory conservation subsidy to exist in its present form. 144
The Council was a noble idea, but the lustification for its continued existence hangs in the balance. The assumptions that supported its creation
for power planning purposes have proven erroneous, and its fish and wildlife authority is too lim142. See Gerald Bouck. Thirty Years Taughi That Money Ion
Save Salmon, OR GONIAN, Oct. 20, 1995. at 7. Dr. Bouck received his
doctorate from Michigan State University and has worked for
BPA, the U.S. Fish and wildlife Service, and the Environmental
Protection Agency.
143. See NoRTmwEsT POWER PLANNING COUNaLDoc. No. 96-4,
PROPOSALS FOR FISH AND WLwuFE GOVERNANCE NTHE COLUMBA Rnu
BASIN (1996); DAVID
H. GETCHES, REPORT TO THE NORTHWEST POWER
PLANNING COUNCIL FROM THE VORKHOP ON FISH AND WILDIoFE
GovEuRNNcE (1996) (available upon request from the Northwest
Power'Planning Council as Doc. No. 96-3).
144. See Preston Michie. Impacts of ihe Pacic Northwest Electric
Power Planning and Conservation Act on the De'elopment of Energy
Resources in the Pacific Northwest: An Analysis of the Resource Acquisition
ProrityScheme, 4 U. PUGET SOUND L REv. 285, 299-332 (1981).
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ited. The region's governors have yet to unify around
the pnnciple that the Council will serve as their primary vehicle to coordinate natural resources and
energy policy, and the geo-political divisions
between upriver and downriver States have increasingly politicized the decisionmaking process. Finally.
there is the issue of whether it is prudent to divide
planning and implementation responsibilities. This
can limit accountability for results.
The Council currently serves as a vehicle by
which BPA can be "guided" to transfer ratepayer
funds to state and tribal fish and wildlife and energy programs. The entitlement issues must be recognized and addressed. BPA is acting as a funding collector and the Council is one of the three bodies,
together with the National Marine Fisheries Service
and the Fish and Wildlife Service, responsible for
distributing benefits. A preferred alternative might
be for BPA to make "in lieu" payments directly to
fish and wildlife managers, augmenting as necessary the federal budgets of the National Marine
Fisheries Service and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service. The payments could be tied to BPA's financial status, expressed as a percentage of BPA's net
revenue. When BPA makes money, funding levels
would increase; in times of economic stress, funds
would be reduced. BPA must be assured that these
"in lieu" payments satisfy its environmental responsibilities; otherwise, there is no reason to make the
payments. 145 If the states and federal agencies
desire to coordinate activities among themselves,
which is particularly important in the fish and
wildlife area, they can use existing vehicles such as
the Washington-Oregon fisheries compact, or the
Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Authority. While
this will not necessarily assure improved results, it
is virtually impossible to devise a model that would
do so given the strongly polarized views regarding
"best science," the multitude of jurisdictions with
overlapping authority, the strong personalities of
fisheries managers, and the many politically active
interest groups currently tracking these issues.
145. The recent debate regarding the "suffiaency- issue
loses sight of several critical facts. First. BPAs payment was not
an 'arbitrarycap. it was proposed to be tied to net revenues to a
significant extent. Second. even If it Is a cap. It can hardly be
called arbitrary. it represented the single largest proposed expenditure of funds for fish and wildlife in the world. Some "cap";
everyone should have such a 'cap.' Finally, there Is no good reason for BPA ratepayers to commit to pay such staggenng sums
without assurances that BPAwill not be sued by third parties who
will find judges willing to Impose orders that would cost even
more and further reduce the ablifty of the agency to compete in
the new, deregulated utility environment. It goes without saying
that if BPA cannot compete and survive there will be little likelihood of money for the fish and wildlife program, except through
state or federal appropriations.
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Stated differently, BPA is good at its core business
of power sales and transmission services, and
should focus on these. BPA is not particularly good
at overseeing the largest fish and wildlife program
in the world, and to expect such oversight is to
146
expect too much.
f. Fish and Wildlife
BPA's fish and wildlife responsibilities are real
and will not quickly be satisfied. They are, however,
of two distinct types: those undertaken to satisfy
the Northwest Power Act and those undertaken in
furtherance of Endangered Species Act listings.
BPA's Northwest Power Act responsibilities are
an entitlement from which there is likely no escape.
They should be recognized as such and treated as a
cost of doing business, with BPA possibly making
"in lieu" payments in the manner previously dis7
cussed.14
Regarding Endangered Species Act expenditures, however, the funding process should be
changed to assure that BPA has at least a "level
playing field" with other federal agencies. Section
7(a)(2) of the Endangered Species Act, and implementing regulations, provides that federal agencies
shall "insure that any action ... is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered
species." 148 The ESA does not, however, provide a
means to "insure" or pay for this result; instead,
appropriations must be requested for this purpose.
BPA is different: it has used the Bonneville fund
to routinely include both Northwest Power Act and
ESA funding in its budget, leaving to the
Administration and then to the Appropriations
Committees the responsibility to change the bud146. Tribes have been the recipients of substantial BPA fund-

ing, as well as federal agencies. The latter should be funded
through congressional appropnations which has a built-in system
of checks and balances. Tribes can receive funding in partnership
with the states. There is no treaty right to such BPA ratepayer
funds, although the states would as a practical matter be well
served to call upon tribal expertise and treat them as sovereign
partners in the attempt to implement their fish and wildlife efforts.
147. Alternatively, BPA could undertake a rulemaking to
answer the still unanswered questions regarding § 4h(10) of the
Northwest Power Act: what is the extent of the Administrator's
mitigation obligation, and how much of that obligation has been
satisfied? See 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(10)(A) (1994). Is it possible over
time to satisfy the obligation for impacts caused by the "construction" and the continued "operation?" See id.What is meant by
the "in lieu" provision that seemingly requires states, federal
agencies, and others with fish and wildlife obligations that existed prior to the Northwest Power Act's passage to pay for those
costs instead of looking to BPA ratepayers? Id.How shall project
costs be allocated? See id. § 839b(h)(10)(C) (1994).
Such a rulemaking was likely anticipated by Congress when
It enacted the Northwest Power Act, but it has never been undertaken and BPA's role as a provider of public benefits is so central
to funding northwest fish and wildlife activities that it may be
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get by including "such specific directives or limitations" as may be felt needed in appropriation
acts. 49 This is so despite the fact that :he BPA is not
expressly authorized to make expenditures for ESA
purposes from the Bonneville fund.
This budgetary practice has developed because
in many important respects, the Council's Fish and
Wildlife Program and the ESA Biological Opinion
measures are indistinguishable. Over time a synergy has developed between the Council Program and
the ESA federal agencies efforts. They frequently
overlap, and both tend to grow exponentially as first
the Council and then the federal agencies attempt
to show each can "do more for the fish" than the
other. Bonneville ratepayers watch this "fish gamesmanship" and pay the bills.
In reauthorizing the ESA, Congress should carefully consider a provision directing that all ESA
expenditures be obtained solely by t~ie traditional
appropriations process. This would need to be coupled with a recognition that BPA's Noithwest Power
Act fish and wildlife program is a non-ESA expenditure which should still be paid from tie Bonneville
fund, subject to such "directives or limitations" of
the Appropriations Committees as currently prescribed by law,150 or as an payments to the state and
federal fish and wildlife programs in new BPA legislation to replace the Northwest Power Act.isi
A second option exists. It would have Congress
recognize that society's values have changed. Dams
which were constructed primarily for power purposes are now used primarily for fish migration. It is not
fair for BPA ratepayers to shoulder this de facto
reauthorization of the projects. The benefit of the
BPA ratepayer bargain to repay projects costs in
practically impossible to do so now.
148. Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (1073) (codified as
amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-44 (1994))
149. 16 U.S.C. § 838(i)(b) (1994).
150. Absent a directive to BPA to make "in lieu" payments to
satisfy fish and wildlife responsibilities, BPA could undertake a rulemaking to determine which of its expenditures were attributable to
the ESA and which were attnbutable -tor the Northwest Power Act,
Those that were pnmarily for ESA purposes would be subject to the
same appropnations process that other agencies must follow for
obtaining money to implement Biological Opinions. This would at
least create a level playing field. Non-ESA expenditures, those
undertaken under the Northwest Power Act, would continue to be
paid directly from the fund as Congress intended,
151. The Bonneville Fund authorizes the BPA Administrator
to make payments "as shall be required to carry out the purpose
and provisions of the lNorthwest Power Ac:l." 16 U.S.C, §
838i(b)(i2) (1994). The latter Act specifically focuses on anadromous fish. 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(2)(c). b(h)f6)(E)(l)-(il) (1994). The
Administrator "shall use the Bonneville.. .fund ind the authorities under this chapter and other laws administered by the
Administrator to protect, mitigate, and enhance lish and wildlife,"
16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(10)(A) (1994).
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exchange for power benefits has materially
changed. Fish are a national resource. The dams
should be expressly reauthorized with their capital
costs assessed directly to fish and wildlife on a
non-reimbursable basis. Irrigation costs now
assumable by BPA would likewise become the
responsibility of those who directly benefit: the irrigators. This would assure that all taxpayers, not just
BPA ratepayers, share in the obligation to repay the
Treasury. For a variety of reasons, including potential "sconng" problems under the Graham-Rudman
Act, this is unlikely to happen.
Regrettably, no matter which alternative is chosen, there is little reason to be optimistic about the
return of the great fish runs of the Columbia. If biologists cannot even agree to undertake basic
research to answer such fundamental questions as
whether there is a positive relationship between
increased river flow and smolt survival, policy leaders can hardly be expected to craft a strategy that
works. Even if the biologists could agree, until
ocean salmon harvest is controlled, habitat
improved, hatcheries retooled, and other non-river
variables addressed, the number of returning adult
salmon will remain at low levels.
VI. Conclusion
While it may be politically impossible to do so,
fairness requires that all public benefits and entitlements be evaluated together. Anything short of
such a far reaching assessment will be viewed by
those whose benefits are offered up as unreasonable. They will be right. At the same time, the
lessons of the Regional Act must be remembered:
specific, complex, and highly technical legislation
whose authors presume they know the future and
can write it into law for all time will fail. Bonneville
is a powerful agent of economic and environmental
benefit to the Pacific Northwest. It must have discretion and flexibility to adjust to changed circumstances. BPA decisionmaking is best limited not
through legislative fiat but by giving it the tools to
adapt to change. Agencies such as BPA are best
influenced by the normal and natural political
processes that shape public policy formation. As
the Pacific Northwest is learning, it is much easier
to change policy than it is to rewrite organic
statutes.
The Regional Act is largely a failure and must
be significantly amended. And while BPA may fairly
be faulted for agreeing to such a complex, entitlements laden law, it did so with the best of intentions and at the behest of its customers. The goal
was to win approval of what has to date proven to
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be a largely unneeded resource acquisition authority, and to set in place a system of public benefits
and entitlements that could only be paid for so long
as the Act's assumptions remained valid.
The reality today is that the assumptions that
were to make the law work have largely proven
wrong. As a result BPA is left with an unworkable
statute which limits BPA's authority to market
power, set rates, and to adjust the costs of public
benefits. The statute needs wholesale rewriting if
BPA is to survive.
What, then. is the case for BPA's survival? Why
should it not be privatized? The answer, it is submitted, is in part that BPA is one of those rare federal agencies which actually strives to conduct its
operations consistent with sound business principles, and repays with interest the investment that
taxpayers have made in its facilities. Such agencies
should be emulated, not eviscerated.
A second part of the answer lies in the fact that
while BPA changes to better compete in a deregulated climate, it continues to bring positive economic and environmental benefits to the Pacific
Northwest and the west coast in general. For more
than sixty years BPAs low electric rates have benefitted consumers and served as a "yardstick" to
assure that competitors do the same. During this
same period, its engineers have constructed a world
renown, highly reliable transmission system
stretching from Canada to California. And finally,
since 1980, BPA ratepayers have invested billions in
socially desirable conservation, renewable
resources, and fish and wildlife programs.
Before BPA is dismantled, policy and political
leaders should carefully consider what will take its
place. One of the risks of revolution is that it can on
occasion lose sight of the good in that which is
being revolted against. And truly, the electric industry and BPA are involved in a major revolution.
The lessons of deregulation teach that while in
the short term consumers can benefit, in the long
run companies frequently raise rates to recover
what was lost during more competitive times. What
will substitute for the BPA yardstick' of low electric
rates when this occurs? And who better than BPA is
prepared to manage a regional transmission system
with equal access for all users? Was this not one of
the primary purpose underlying the Transmission
System Act of 1974 which entrusted BPA with this
responsibility?
Finally, the social benefits that BPA brings to
the region through its financial commitment to conservation, renewable resources, and fish and
wildlife enhancement should not be discounted.
Without BPA funding, these programs will likely
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compete on a federal and state level for appropriated dollars in an increasingly constrained financial
climate. Does anyone seriously believe that they
will fare as well? And while certain utilities and
economists argue that their inclusion "distorts the
marketplace by artificially increasing rates," there is
little evidence that the public desires to sacrifice
such efforts.
The Northwest has benefited immensely from
the leadership of Senator Mark Hatfield (R-OR). He
has picked up Senator Jackson's mantle even when
it was a greater "political liability" than a "political
win." For that we owe him a debt of gratitude. And
to Senator Hatfield and others who placed regional
economic and environmental interests over
parochial benefits, we look for leadership in chang1
ing the Regional Act and revitalizing the BPA. 52
VII. Postscript
This Article was conceived in late 1994. Events
have overtaken it and a postscript is appropriate.
While the assumptions regarding the demise of the
Northwest Power Act have proven more correct than
initially imagined, the 'Walls" are still "Tumbling
Down" and are likely to continue to do so for the
foreseeable future. BPA's "reconstruction," if that is
the chosen path, is still well in the future.
From a legislative perspective, now is the time
for the testing of ideas, not the time for action.
While important reforms such as the debt refinancing bill have recently become law, whether and
when other major legislative change will occur is far
less certain and awaits the completion of the
Governors' "Regional Review" process still to be
fully developed is the more recent initiative of
Senator Slade Gorton (R-WA), who could emerge as
the successor to Senator Hatfield as the region's
political leader on BPA issues. In both forums, competing visions of BPA's future are offered-visions
that range from agency dismantlement to restructuring with powers more typically provided government corporations paralleling and reflecting the
ongoing deregulation movement.
152. Senator Hatfield has announced his retirement. In a
March 8, 1995 address to BPA employees, he urged that the
region look for a new political leader to champion BPA issues.
Otherwise, he observed, the issues are passed from office to
office without one individual taking clear ownership. Senator
Slade Gorton (R-WA) is emerging as that new leader, and is well
positioned with significant seniority on the Senate
Appropriations Committee. On the Democratic side.
Congressman Norm Dick (D-WA). a protege of 'Scoop" Jackson.
has been active, and is a logical successor to Senator Jackson.
The Pacific Northwest and BPA need strong political leaders on
these issues especially at this time.
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In the interim, Bonneville continues to change.
It is in the midst of an administrative "refocus" and
"reengineering effort" which may well result in the
creation of several semi-independent business
lines: power; transmission services; and energy services. A central corporate office could provide overall direction and coordination. This initiative may
be completed as early as October 1, 1996, the start
of the next fiscal year, and could go a long way
toward aligning BPA with changes that are occurring
in the increasingly deregulated electric utility business, prompted by the recently finalized FERC Rule
for open access transmission service.
If the region's political institutions decide there
is value in preserving BPA by reshaping its organic
legislation, it is hoped they will seriously consider:
(1) a flexible statute that allows the Administrator
to react to a rapidly changing utility ousiness as a
governmental corporation; (2) a board of directors
reflecting regional and federal interests and needs;
(3) restructuring of the authorities of the Power
Planning Council; (4) modification or repeal of all
legislative benefits and entitlements to assure a
competitive power product which is also priced to
support BPA's ability to timely repay its Treasury
obligation; and (5) a level playing field for fish and
wildlife mitigation between BPA ratepayers and the
general population in relation to ESA and non-ESA
initiatives.
From a personal perspective, it is submitted
that the powerful ideas that underlayt BPAs Initial
creation more than fifty years ago are equally valid
today. These ideas are to "assure an adequate, efficient, economical and reliable power and transmission service at the lowest possible cost consistent
with sound business principles", to do so by providing a "yardstick for competition" among other electric utilities with resulting benefits to the "the general public, and particularly of domestic and rural
consumers", to "timely repay the Treasury debt",
and to finance key public interest programs for conservation and fish and wildlife. Whether that vision
of Franklin. Roosevelt, Henry Jackscn, and Mark
Hatfield is still valid remains to be seen.i 53
153. Those with a desire to follow these lssues on a continuing basis may wish to consult httpJ/www.newsdata.comlenernet/review/revew.html for all of the materials and debate surrounding the Governors' "Comprehensive Review of the
Northwest Energy System." Other valuable websites Include
"Northwest Enernet" and thd"180-Day Report: Regional Fish and
Wildlife Governance," both of which are accessible from the
address above or from newsdata@newsdata.con,

